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THE SUPREME COURT’S QUIET REVOLUTION:
REDEFINING THE MEANING OF JURISDICTION
ERIN MORROW HAWLEY*
ABSTRACT
Over the last three decades, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts
have carried out a quiet revolution in the nature and meaning of
jurisdiction. Historically, federal courts generally treated procedural
requirements, like filing deadlines and exhaustion prerequisites, as
presumptively “jurisdictional.” In case after case, the modern Court
has reversed course. The result has been an unobtrusive but seminal
redefinition of what jurisdiction means to begin with: the adjudicato-
ry authority of the federal courts. This shift is momentous, but it has
been obscured by the Court’s erstwhile imposition of a clear statement
requirement. For courts to find a statutory requirement jurisdic-
tional, Congress must have clearly said so.
Scholars have applauded this new interpretive technique, yet even
though the Court’s more precise definition of jurisdiction is a
welcome development, the Court’s emphasis on the clear statement
rule is a mistake. To begin, the Supreme Court’s application of its
clear statement rule is inconsistent. As a result, the Court’s decisions
are unpredictable, and Congress is left to guess how “clear” a clear
statement must be. Second, the rule may not clarify dialogue between
the courts and Congress because the Court has imposed it retroac-
tively. Third, the Court has not tied its command to the protection of
an important constitutional value, and there is a strong argument to
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be made that the rule unconstitutionally augments the Court’s auth-
ority at the expense of Congress’s unquestioned power over the scope
of Article III jurisdiction.
Ultimately, the Court’s turn to a clear statement rule is unneces-
sary. A close analysis of the Supreme Court’s recent cases reveals it
is the Court’s quiet redefinition of jurisdiction that has been doing
the work. The Court is right to demand precision as to jurisdiction.
But the clear statement rule is a problematic and unnecessary at-
tempt to carry that mandate into effect. This Article argues that the
Court should jettison its clear statement requirement and focus on
what it really wants to ask, and should have been asking all along:
Did Congress intend this provision to oust the federal courts of their
power to adjudicate this case?
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Over the last three decades, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts
have carried out a quiet revolution in the nature and meaning of
jurisdiction. Historically, federal courts generally treated procedur-
al requirements, like filing deadlines and exhaustion prerequisites,
as “jurisdictional.”2 The early Court frequently used the term juris-
diction to refer not only to authority-conferring provisions, but also
to procedural requirements.3 Not anymore. In case after case, the
modern Court has abandoned its treatment of procedural require-
ments as presumptively jurisdictional.4 The result has been an
unobtrusive but seminal redefinition of what jurisdiction means. In
a word, the Court’s cases have narrowed the definition of jurisdic-
tion to mean only the courts’ power to decide cases. Statutory re-
quirements are jurisdictional only to the extent they are directed
specifically at the adjudicatory authority of the federal courts.
This shift is momentous, as only a few scholars have realized.5
Ironically, the principal reason so few have appreciated this revolu-
tion may be the Court itself. Even as they were rethinking jurisdic-
tion, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts chose to emphasize not their
remodeled definition, but rather an interpretive technique for
classifying statutory provisions as jurisdictional. To find a require-
ment jurisdictional, Congress must have clearly said so.6 It is this
1. 132 S. Ct. 641, 664 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See infra Part I.A.
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 88-
89 (2008) [hereinafter Dodson, Removal Jurisdiction]; Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles
v. Russell, 43 TULSA L. REV. 631, 641-43 (2008) [hereinafter Dodson, The Failure of Bowles
v. Russell] (celebrating the Court’s clear statement rule); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction
and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 643 (2005) [hereinafter Wasserman, Jurisdiction and
Merits]; Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a
Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547, 1547 (2008) [hereinafter Wasserman, Jurisdiction,
Merits, and Procedure]; Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional
Rulings,” 105 NW. U. L. REV. 947, 953 (2011) [hereinafter Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-
By Jurisdictional Rulings”].
6. See infra Part I.B.
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clear statement rule that the Court has made the focus of its recent
jurisdictional cases.7 And the innovation has been warmly met by
the academy.8
Even though the Court’s more precise definition of jurisdiction is
a welcome development, the Court’s emphasis on the clear state-
ment rule is a major mistake for several reasons. To begin, the
Supreme Court’s application of its clear statement rule is inconsis-
tent. The Court invokes it when it wants to, but ignores it in other
circumstances, without much rhyme or reason. For example, stare
decisis ordinarily does not matter when it comes to clear statement
rules, but the Court has recently treated precedent as dispositive in
several procedural requirements cases.9 As a result, the Court’s de-
cisions are unpredictable, and Congress is left to guess how “clear”
a clear statement must be.
Second, the best justifications for clear statement rules general-
ly—that they are democracy enhancing because they facilitate and
clarify dialogue between the courts and Congress—do not apply
here. The Supreme Court has imposed its clear statement rule ret-
roactively, upsetting, rather than facilitating, congressional dia-
logue.10
Third, the Court’s use of the clear statement rule in the jurisdic-
tional context is unique in that, unlike other clear statement rules,
here the Supreme Court has not tied its “speak clearly when you
mean jurisdiction” command to the protection of an important con-
stitutional value. Indeed, to require a clear statement from Con-
gress as to jurisdiction implicates separation of powers principles.
There is a strong argument to be made that this jurisdictional
“clarity tax” unconstitutionally augments the Court’s authority at
the expense of Congress’s unquestioned power over the scope of
Article III jurisdiction.
Ultimately, the Court’s turn to a clear statement rule on jurisdic-
tion is a blind alley precisely because it is unnecessary. A close
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See Stephen R. Brown, Hearing Congress’s Jurisdictional Speech: Giving Meaning to
the “Clearly-States” Test in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 33, 64-66 (2009);
Dodson, Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 88-90; Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v.
Russell, supra note 5, at 643; Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure, supra note 5.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.C.
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analysis of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisdictional cases reveals
that it is not in fact the clear statement rule that holds water. It is
the Court’s quiet redefinition of jurisdiction. Although many today
equate the term “jurisdiction” with the judicial power to hear a case,
the historical understanding of the term was much broader, encom-
passing procedural requirements.11 The Court’s recent cases reveal
the tension between the old and new conceptions of jurisdiction
coming to a head, and the Court choosing the narrower definition.12
The Court is right to demand precision as to jurisdiction. But the
clear statement rule is a clumsy, distracting, and ultimately unnec-
essary attempt to carry that mandate into effect. Once we jettison
it, the true import of the Court’s jurisdictional project comes into
focus. What the contemporary Court really wants to ask, and should
have been asking all along, is this: Did Congress intend this
provision to oust the federal courts of their power to adjudicate this
case?
To say that jurisdiction matters is a dramatic understatement.
The power to hear cases—or not—goes to the very heart of what
courts are and what they do. Courts are asked every day to deter-
mine whether statutory requirements are jurisdictional. Indeed,
procedural requirements are at issue in every case—they include
everything from filing deadlines, to exhaustion requirements, to liti-
gating prerequisites such as copyright registration. Under today’s
understanding of jurisdiction, if a procedural requirement is juris-
dictional, it is absolute.13 Parties may not waive or forfeit such
requirements and the federal courts may not create equitable
exceptions—however meritorious the excuse.14 In view of these
consequences, it is time to recognize the contemporary Court’s
narrowing of the term jurisdiction for what it is: revolutionary.
Part I analyzes the development and contours of the Supreme
Court’s clear statement requirement for jurisdictional conditions.
Part II concludes that the application of this approach has been
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. See infra Part I.B.
13. Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 610 (2010) (“The parties cannot waive it, nor can
a court extend that deadline for equitable reasons.”).
14. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011); Dolan, 560 U.S.
at 610; Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514
(2006). 
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problematic. The Supreme Court’s invocation of context is incon-
sistent with clear statement rules generally, and its occasional
reliance on stare decisis creates significant tension with the clear
statement rule and leads to unpredictable results. The clear state-
ment requirement also is troublesome because it operates retroac-
tively, reversing the historical, presumptively jurisdictional ap-
proach that the Marshall and Taney Courts had adopted. Finally,
the undertheorized clear statement rule is a poor fit because it does
not protect important constitutional values and may itself create
constitutional tensions. Part III decodes the Supreme Court’s pro-
cedural requirements cases and establishes that the key doctrinal
shift is a narrowed definition of the term “jurisdiction,” not the clear
statement rule. It also suggests a way forward—a straight-forward
application of the question whether Congress conditioned the adjud-
icatory power of the federal courts—and briefly sketches out key
considerations under this new inquiry.
I. HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF THE CLEAR STATEMENT RULE
The Supreme Court’s methodology for determining whether a
procedural requirement is jurisdictional has fluctuated wildly. The
Marshall Court held certain procedural requirements jurisdictional.
The Taney Court took things further, adopting what amounted to a
presumption that procedural requirements were jurisdictional. This
presumption carried through in large measure to the more modern
Supreme Court that has often endorsed a broad and imprecise view
of the term jurisdiction. The past few decades, however, have seen
a sea change in methodology. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts
have adopted the opposite presumption: as the Court now has it, a
precondition is jurisdictional only when Congress clearly says so.15
Underlying this shift in approach has been the Court’s changing
conception of jurisdiction. Early courts routinely held various pro-
cedural requirements to be jurisdictional.16 But the cases suggest
15. See infra Part I.B.
16. United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106, 113 (1848) (dismissing as out of time
upon motion); Yeaton v. Lenox, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 123, 126-27 (1834) (dismissing for improperly
joining claims in a bill); United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 173-74 (1805)
(dismissing for want of jurisdiction); Bailiff v. Tipping, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 406, 406 (1805)
(dismissing for want of jurisdiction—no indication as to whether upon party’s motion); Lloyd
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that the Court may not have had in mind the strict nonwaivable
sort of jurisdiction that we think of today.17 During the Civil War
era, the Taney Court began to apply a more rigid definition of
jurisdiction—one that defined the term as going to the Court’s
adjudicatory power—to various procedural requirements.18 The
more modern Court also often found procedural requirements to be
jurisdictional.19 This broad notion of what counted as jurisdictional,
along with the Court’s evolution to a strict interpretation of the
consequences that attend a jurisdictional statute, pressured the
Court to rethink how it defined jurisdiction. The Court’s most recent
cases reveal this tension and the Court’s emphasis on a more
narrow definition of jurisdiction.
A. Historical Approaches to Procedural Requirements
From its earliest years, the Supreme Court held certain proce-
dural requirements jurisdictional. In 1796, Chief Justice Ellsworth
v. Alexander, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 365, 366 (1803) (quashing writ for lack of citation without
mentioning a motion); United States v. Hooe, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 318, 320 (1803) (dismissing
for failure to include statement of facts upon request of the Attorney General).
17. See Mussina v. Cavazos, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 355, 358-59, 363 (1867) (refusing to dismiss
for failure to attach writ of error because the original had been burned in a fire, and rejecting
notion that “a rigid and literal fulfillment of every [condition on appeal] is an absolute and
indispensable requisite to appellate jurisdiction”); United States v. Gomez, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
752, 763 (1865) (explaining that the “jurisdictional” rule has good-cause exceptions and such
exceptions are “indispensable limitations to guard against fraud and circumvention, and to
prevent a failure of justice”); Mesa v. United States, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 721, 722 (1862)
(dismissing for failure to timely file transcript); United States v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506,
511-13, 526 (1859) (reversing for lack of jurisdiction a writ of habeas corpus issued by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court for a man arrested under a federal warrant under the fugitive slave
law); Steamer Va. v. West, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 182, 183 (1856) (dismissing upon motion, with-
out describing consequences of term jurisdiction and noting that a new appeal might be filed);
Villabolos v. United States, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 81, 87, 91 (1848) (dismissing upon motion;
litigant’s suggestion that waiver/abandonment by Attorney General of jurisdictional condition
meant that the Court need not address the contention); Catlett v. Brodie, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
553, 555 (1824) (dismissing case for failure to provide sufficient security unless within thirty
days such security was provided); The San Pedro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 132, 142-43 (1817)
(holding that provisions previously labeled jurisdictional must be “substantially observed”);
Blackwell v. Patten, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 277, 278 (1812) (finding irregularity insufficient to
quash); Course v. Stead, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 22, 25 (1800) (same); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S.
(4 Dall.) 12, 13-14 (1800) (holding a blank return date was nondismissable clerical error).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 37-66.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 67-85.
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explained that Article III qualified the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction by “such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the
Congress shall make.”20 As a result, “[i]f Congress has provided no
rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise an appellate
jurisdiction; and if the rule is provided, we cannot depart from it.”21
Because the Judiciary Act of 1789 required that a statement of facts
accompany the transcript in chancery cases,22 the Court held that
it must dismiss a writ of error unless a statement of facts appeared
on the record.23
A few years later, Chief Justice Marshall agreed: “as the jurisdic-
tion of the [C]ourt has been described, it has been regulated by
[C]ongress, and an affirmative description of its powers must be
understood as a regulation, under the [C]onstitution, prohibiting the
exercise of other powers than those described.”24 The Court, Chief
Justice Marshall wrote, may only review judgments over which “a
power to reexamine ... is expressly given by law.”25
The Marshall Court routinely dismissed cases that failed to
comply with statutory procedural requirements, often in the context
of section 22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Section 22 authorized an
appeal to the Supreme Court provided that certain requirements
were met:
[U]pon a writ of error, whereto shall be annexed and returned
therewith at the day and place therein mentioned, an authenti-
cated transcript of the record, an assignment of errors, and
prayer for reversal, with a citation to the adverse party, signed
by the judge of such district court, or a justice of the Supreme
Court.26
20. Wiscart v. D’Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
cl. 2). 
21. Id.
22. Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 19, 1 Stat. 73, 83
(1789).
23. Wiscart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 330; see also United States v. Hooe, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 318,
320 (1803).
24. United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 173 (1805). 
25. Id. 
26. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 84.
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The Marshall Court dismissed appeals for lack of jurisdiction, and
writs of error for want of a citation27 and failure to comply with the
five-year statute of limitations.28
Key to deciphering these cases is understanding what the Court
meant by the term “jurisdiction.” The Court’s early cases suggest
that it may have had in mind a less consequential view of the term.
For example, the Court noted that substantial compliance could
satisfy a “jurisdictional” provision and that jurisdictional require-
ments were potentially waivable.29
By the mid-nineteenth century, the Supreme Court had developed
an unstated presumption viewing preconditions to suit as jurisdic-
tional requirements.30 The Taney Court gave jurisdictional effect to
a broad swath of arguably ambiguous preconditions to suit. Inter-
preting section 22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it held that the
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to review a writ of error or
appeal31 unless: (1) the writ of error be returned by the end of the
next term,32 (2) the writ of error be signed by the lower court judge,33
(3) an authenticated transcript be filed the next succeeding term
after the appeal is taken,34 and (4) the appeal be brought within five
years.35 The Court could not ignore these requirements because they
27. See, e.g., Bailiff v. Tipping, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 406, 406 (1805); Lloyd v. Alexander, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 365, 366 (1803).
28. See Yeaton v. Lenox, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 123, 126-27 (1834); see also Catlett v. Brodie, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 553, 554-55 (1824) (dismissing pending payment of sufficient bond under
chapter 20, section 22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which requires the judge to take “good and
sufficient security”). 
29. See The San Pedro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 132, 142 (1817).
30. See Mussina v. Cavazos, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 355, 358 (1867) (“[I]t is undoubtedly true
that this [C]ourt has gone very far in requiring strict compliance with the acts of Congress
under which cases are transferred from inferior tribunals to this [C]ourt.”). 
31. The Judiciary Act of 1803 provided that appeals from decrees issued in chancery were
“subject to the same rules, regulations and restrictions as are prescribed in law in case of
writs of error,” that is, section 22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 40, § 2,
2 Stat. 244, 244.
32. United States v. Gomez, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 752, 763 (1865); Mesa v. United States, 67
U.S. (2 Black) 721 (1862); Steamer Va. v. West, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 182, 182-83 (1856); United
States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106 (1848); Villabolos v. United States, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 81,
90 (1848).
33. Villabolos, 47 U.S. at 90; The San Pedro, 15 U.S. at 142.
34. Gomez, 70 U.S. at 763; Mesa, 67 U.S. at 721; Steamer Va., 60 U.S. at 182; Curry, 47
U.S. at 106; Villabolos, 47 U.S. at 90.
35. Mesa, 67 U.S. at 721; Steamer Va., 60 U.S. at 182; see also Scarborough v. Pargoud,
108 U.S. 567, 568 (1883) (“[T]he writ of error in this case was not brought within the time
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provided “the foundations” of the Court’s jurisdiction, “without
which [the Court] ha[d] no right to revise the action of the inferior
court.”36
That the Taney Court regarded preconditions as presumptively
jurisdictional is evidenced in Castro v. United States.37 In that case,
the Supreme Court spliced jurisdictional requirements onto a
statute that was silent on the issue.38 The California Land Act of
1851 authorized district courts in California to settle private land
claims.39 Unlike other land-claim statutes,40 the California Land Act
did not condition appeal on compliance with the conditions of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, but rather indicated that an appeal could be
taken upon authorization of the district court.41 Even though Con-
gress had not specified any additional limitation on the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction, the Court concluded that Congress
must have had the 1789 statute in mind when it provided for
appeals under the Land Act.42 The Court wrote that those appeals,
then, “must be considered as having been made subject to those reg-
ulations, and must be dismissed for want of conformity to them.”43
The Castro Court’s interpretation of the California Land Act may
be defensible given the context of prior land-claim statutes, but the
Supreme Court pointed to no evidence that Congress meant to adopt
prior procedures.44 The Court instead limited a statutory grant of
appellate jurisdiction that did not itself “impose any limitation.”45
Moreover, the Court overlooked the fact that, unlike other land-
claim statutes, which authorized appeals as of right,46 the California
limited by law, and we have consequently no jurisdiction.”).
36. Edmonson v. Bloomshire, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 306, 310 (1868).
37. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 46 (1865).
38. Id. at 51.
39. Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 633. 
40. See, e.g., Act of June 17, 1844, ch. 95, 5 Stat. 676; Act of May 23, 1828, ch. 70, 4 Stat.
284; Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 95, § 2, 4 Stat. 52.
41. Castro, 70 U.S. at 51. The Act “ma[de] no provision concerning returns to th[e
Supreme Court], and none concerning citations; nor d[id] it impose any limitation of time
within which appeals may be allowed.” Id.
42. Id. Because Congress had proscribed regulations “for the most usual invocation of
appellate jurisdiction,” it “doubtless” had those “regulations in view” when it provided for
appeals in the California Land Act of 1851. Id.
43. Id. 
44. See generally id. 
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., Act of June 17, 1844, ch. 95, 5 Stat. 676; Act of May 23, 1828, ch. 70, 4 Stat.
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Land Act granted appeal only upon authorization from the district
court.47 Given the administrative morass that the litigation of land
claims had occasioned,48 it is possible that Congress decided—in lieu
of the usual conditions on appeal—to leave authorization to the
court most familiar with the matter. In short, the Taney Court’s
insistence on reading the California Land Act jurisdictionally is
quite remarkable.49
Insurance Co. of the Valley of Virginia v. Mordecai is another
aggressive interpretation of a statute to which the jurisdictional
label did not obviously apply.50 Mordecai dismissed an appeal for
want of jurisdiction when the lower court had misstated the first
day of the Supreme Court’s term on the writ of error.51 Yet the
statute at issue, the Act of May 8, 1792, did not by its terms require
that the writ of error be made returnable on the first day of
term—that requirement was a result of judicial gloss.52 Further,
although the Court interpreted the Act of May 8, 1792 to require
that the return and transcript be filed on the first day of term, it
further held that they could in fact be filed any day during the term
because “for certain purposes of convenience or justice, the term is
considered as but one period of time—as one day, and that day the
first of the term.”53 The Mordecai Court nevertheless refused to
apply the “one day” rule to the misstated return date, finding that
the failure to properly identify the “legal return day” was fatal to
jurisdiction.54
The Taney Court professed to disallow equitable exceptions, but
its broad view of what counted as a jurisdictional condition, coupled
with its changing conception of what the term jurisdiction meant,
created pressure to forge exceptions, foreshadowing the Court’s
current change in approach. By 1866, the Court was of the view that
jurisdiction could not be waived, but must be raised by a court sua
284; Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 96, § 2, 4 Stat. 52.
47. Castro, 70 U.S. at 50-51.
48. Id. at 51.
49. Id. 
50. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 195 (1858).
51. Id. at 199-200.
52. Id. at 196.
53. Id. at 201.
54. Id. at 200. 
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sponte.55 If a condition was jurisdictional, no excuse, however
meritorious, would merit review. The harshness of this result led to
the eventual adoption of exceptions even to requirements the Taney
Court had labeled “jurisdictional.” The Supreme Court, for example,
had long held jurisdictional the requirement that a certified tran-
script be docketed in the next term of Court.56 Yet late in the Taney
era, cases arose in which the litigant was powerless to obtain a cert-
ified record and the Court twice found a fraud exception to apply.57
Ableman v. Booth gave rise to the fraud exception.58 In that
politically charged case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court annulled a
federal court conviction and granted state habeas relief to a citizen
convicted of aiding the escape of a fugitive slave.59 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court also ordered its clerk “to disregard and refuse
obedience” to the writ of error issued by the Supreme Court under
section 22 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and to refuse to certify a copy
of the record.60 Without expressly creating an exception to the
requirements of section 22, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the
Attorney General’s motion to accept a certified copy of the record
that the Attorney General, and not the state court clerk, had
prepared, and proceeded to the merits of the case.61
A few years later, in United States v. Gomez, the Court referred
to a “well-established” fraud exception but ultimately found it
unnecessary to the disposition in that case.62 In Gomez, a case
fraught with local gamesmanship, the former district attorney had
colluded with the plaintiff to receive part of the land claim at issue,
and the district court had six times refused to certify a copy of the
record to the Supreme Court.63 The Supreme Court noted that the
“fraud” exception established in Ableman v. Booth would apply and
accepted a certified record transcribed by the new district attorney
55. Edmonson v. Bloomshire, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 306, 311 (1868).
56. Villabolos v. United States, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 81, 90 (1848).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 752, 763-64 (1865); Ableman v.
Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
58. 62 U.S. at 506.
59. Id. at 513-14.
60. Id. at 514.
61. Id. at 512.
62. 70 U.S. at 763.
63. Id. at 765.
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(rather than the lower court clerk).64 The Court made some effort to
link the fraud exception to Congress’s jurisdictional grant, stating
that general jurisdictional rules apply unless the case fell within an
exception “derived from the act of Congress allowing appeals.”65
Indeed in Gomez, the exception was unnecessary to the decision
since Congress had provided that certain district attorneys might
transcribe and certify records.66
In short, it is unclear how far the fraud exception endorsed by the
post-Taney Court extended. Booth may be a one-off decision and the
exception was unneeded in Gomez. Still, these two cases suggest
that the Taney Court was occasionally sympathetic to the difficul-
ties created by a broad view of what counts as a jurisdictional con-
dition combined with a strict definition of jurisdiction.
In this vein, the post-Taney Court stopped short of holding that
every requirement contained within section 22 of the 1789 Judiciary
Act was jurisdictional, drawing back on the broad conception of
jurisdiction endorsed in prior cases. In Mussina v. Cavazos, the
Court rejected the argument that return of the original citation,
which had been destroyed in a Civil War fire, was “essential” to the
Court’s jurisdiction.67 In so doing, the Court noted that it had upheld
jurisdiction over cases absent an assignment of errors68 and prayer
for reversal,69 both seemingly required by section 22.70 Contrary to
the strict terms of section 22, Chief Justice Marshall had long-ago
declared that when an “appeal is taken in the open court, during the
term at which it was rendered, in the presence of the appellee, no
citation is necessary, and that a general appearance in this court for
defendant in error, or in appeal, waives the necessity of a citation.”71
Thus, it could not be said that “a rigid and literal fulfilment of
64. Id. at 757, 765.
65. Id. at 763.
66. Id. at 766. Congress had specifically provided by statute that California district
attorneys might transcribe and certify records in land cases to the Supreme Court and that
“records so certified ... shall be taken as true and valid transcripts, to the same intent and
purpose as if certified by the clerk of the proper district.” Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 61, § 2, 12
Stat. 319, 320.
67. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 355, 359 (1867).
68. See Old Nick Williams Co. v. United States, 215 U.S. 541, 544 (1910); Farrar v.
Churchill, 135 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1890).
69. Mussina, 73 U.S. at 359.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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everything prescribed in [section 22], is an absolute and indispens-
able requisite to the appellate jurisdiction of this court.”72
Although the post-Taney Court began to find some procedural
requirements to be nonjurisdictional, the early to mid-twentieth-
century Court largely continued the Taney Court’s broad and im-
precise view of jurisdiction and its predilection to find preconditions
to suit jurisdictional. During this period, the Court used the term
jurisdiction frequently, and even applied it to conditions more read-
ily described as elements of a particular cause of action. In EEOC
v. Arabian American Oil Co., for example, the Court suggested that
the definitional sections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964—defining employer, employee, and the like—were jurisdic-
tional.73 The Court has since clarified that these definitions are part
of the case a plaintiff must prove—not a limit on the federal court’s
subject matter jurisdiction.74
Arabian American Oil Co. was not an anomaly. In 1987, in Gwalt-
ney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., the
Court considered whether section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act
allows suits for wholly past violations.75 The Court unanimously
characterized that question as a matter of “jurisdiction.”76 The lower
courts also frequently used the term jurisdiction to refer to substan-
tive elements.77 As late as 1998, Justice Stevens wrote a passionate
concurrence in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment arguing
that the statutory question in the case “can be viewed in one of two
ways: whether [it] confers ‘jurisdiction’ over citizen suits for wholly
72. Id. The Judiciary Act of 1789 also required that “every justice or judge signing a
citation on any writ of error as aforesaid, shall take good and sufficient security, that the
plaintiff in error shall prosecute his writ to effect, and answer all damages and costs if he fail
to make his plea good.” Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 84, 85. The Court held,
however, that a bond was not an indispensable part of an appeal and where no bond had been
filed, the Court would not dismiss, but permit bond to be filed in the Supreme Court. Seymour
v. Freer, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 822, 823 (1866). 
73. See 499 U.S. 244, 251 (1991) (“Petitioners’ reliance on Title VII’s jurisdictional
provisions.”); id. at 253 (“Thus petitioners’ argument based on the jurisdictional language of
Title VII fails.”).
74. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006).
75. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
76. Id. at 52 (“In this case, we must decide whether § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act, also
known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), confers federal
jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations.”).
77. See JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.30[1] (3d ed. 2014)
(describing the distinction between jurisdiction and claim elements).
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past violations, or whether the statute creates such a ‘cause of
action.’ ”78 The distinction between a jurisdictional provision and a
cause of action made no difference to Justice Stevens: “Rather than
framing the question in terms of ‘jurisdiction,’ it is also possible to
characterize the statutory issue in this case as whether respondent’s
complaint states a ‘cause of action.’ ”79
The Court’s treatment of statutes of limitations is also instruc-
tive. From the late 1800s through the 1950s, statutes of limitations
in suits against the government were considered “jurisdictional”
statutes in the full sense of the term and thus not subject to waiver
or equitable tolling.80 That rule showed signs of weakening in 1967,
and again in 1986, when the Court ignored it in Honda v. Clark81
and Bowen v. City of New York.82 In Honda, the Court concluded
that Japanese nationals whose assets were seized during World
War II were entitled to equitable tolling of a sixty-day statute of
limitations—even though Congress had been silent on the issue.83
In Bowen, the Court allowed equitable tolling of the sixty-day time
limit on challenging the denial of Social Security Disability bene-
fits—again based on the fact that Congress had not “eschewed”
equitable tolling.84 In 1990, in Irwin v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, the Court went a step further, putting in place a rebuttable
presumption that equitable tolling rules applied to suits against the
United States.85 This background interpretive rule effected a rever-
sal in the historical approach.
Until very recently, the Court took an expansive and imprecise
view of the term jurisdiction. The Taney Court in particular viewed
procedural requirements as presumptively jurisdictional. It matter-
ed little whether Congress intended a specific provision to constrain
the authority of the federal courts. The mere existence of a proce-
dural requirement was evidence that Congress meant for it to
operate jurisdictionally. Moreover, the Court’s broad and imprecise
78. 523 U.S. 83, 112-13 (1997) (Stevens, J., concuring).
79. Id. at 117-18.
80. Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957); Finn v. United States, 123 U.S.
227, 232-33 (1887); Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123, 125-26 (1883).
81. 386 U.S. 484, 495-96 (1967).
82. 476 U.S. 467, 478 (1986).
83. Honda, 386 U.S. at 501.
84. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 479-80.
85. 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990).
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view of the term jurisdiction continued well into the twentieth
century. This broad view of what counted as jurisdictional combined
with the Court’s turn to a more strict interpretation of the conse-
quences of jurisdiction set the Court’s cases on a collision course.
B. Origins of the Clear Statement Rule
How times have changed. The Supreme Court has diligently
distinguished jurisdiction from the substantive elements of a claim
and from procedural requirements. In so doing, the Court has im-
posed a clear statement requirement: a provision is jurisdictional
only when Congress plainly says so.86
This rule has its foundations in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, a 1998 case in which the Supreme Court noted that
the term “jurisdiction” had become “a word of many, too many,
meanings.”87 In the Supreme Court’s view, the federal courts had
overused the term, referring to conditions that did not implicate the
adjudicatory authority of the federal courts, and often without
squarely considering the question. Going forward, the Court de-
clared, these “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” would “have no prece-
dential effect.”88
A few years later, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., the Court laid down
a bright-line clear statement rule.89 Arbaugh involved a Title VII
gender discrimination claim brought by an employee under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).90 Title VII only applies to employers that
have “fifteen or more employees.”91 Because Y & H Corporation had
less than fifteen employees, the district court dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.92 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the em-
ployee-numerosity requirement was not a jurisdictional provision.93
86. The story of how the clear statement rule came to be is interesting in and of itself. It
involves a number of different Justices emphasizing different factors, including formalism,
notice, access to courts, efficiency, and fairness. The different coalitions and the evolution of
the Court’s jurisdictional jurisprudence is a worthwhile project for future consideration.
87. 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 1996)). 
88. Id. at 91. 
89. 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006).
90. Id. at 503-04.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).
92. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 504.
93. Id. 
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In so doing, the Court announced the bright line of a clear state-
ment:
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a
statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and
litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle
with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory
limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the
restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.94
Because § 2000e-5(f)(3) did not “clearly state[ ]” that the employ-
ee-numerosity threshold was jurisdictional, the Court concluded
that Congress had not intended the provision to divest the federal
courts of jurisdiction.95
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court has elaborated upon the
clear statement rule announced in Arbaugh. For example, Kontrick
v. Ryan clarified the “jurisdiction” label by delineating between two
types of procedural requirements: (1) claims-processing rules (not
jurisdictional) and (2) jurisdictional rules.96 “[J]urisdiction,” the
Court wrote, refers to “a court’s adjudicatory authority.”97 Jurisdic-
tional statutes speak to the power of the court, not the obligations
of litigants.98 In contrast, claims-processing rules “seek to promote
the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take
certain procedural steps at certain specified times.”99 Applying this
distinction, the Kontrick Court held that several bankruptcy filing
deadlines were claims-processing rules, rather than jurisdictional
ones.100
94. Id. at 515-16 (footnote and citation omitted).
95. Id. at 515 & n.11, 516. 
96. 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004).
97. Id. 
98. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010); Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994); see also Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455.
99. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011); see also
Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455.
100. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455-56. Also important in Kontrick was the fact that the filing
deadlines at issue were nonstatutory court rules. Id. Because “[o]nly Congress may determine
a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,” id. at 452, the Court found it “axiomatic”
that the court-created bankruptcy rules “do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction,” id.
at 453 (quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978)).
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Two recent preconditions cases, Gonzalez v. Thaler101 and Sebelius
v. Auburn Regional Medical Center,102 are good examples of the
Court’s solidifying jurisdictional jurisprudence. As these cases show,
the Supreme Court now looks to text, structure, and context to
distinguish between the jurisdictional and the nonjurisdictional.
In Thaler, the Court considered whether section 2253(c)(3) of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) was juris-
dictional.103 Section 2253(c) provides that the certificate of appeal-
ability (COA) needed for a habeas appeal “shall indicate which
specific issue” raised by the petitioner demonstrates a “substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”104
The Supreme Court first made clear that it meant what it said in
Arbaugh: courts must apply the “clear-statement principle” to
determine whether a procedural requirement is jurisdictional.105
The Court reiterated that “[a] rule is jurisdictional ‘[i]f the Legisla-
ture clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope
shall count as jurisdictional.’ ”106 If no clear statement exists, “courts
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional.”107
Applying this principle, the Court found that “the only ‘clear’
jurisdictional language” in the statute appeared elsewhere, in
section 2253(c)(1).108 That text—“[u]nless a circuit justice or judge
issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to
the court of appeals”—was evidence that Congress knew how to
speak in jurisdictional terms when it so chose.109 In contrast, section
2253(c)(3) simply stated a threshold condition for a COA.110 It did
“not speak in jurisdictional terms.”111 The compulsory nature of the
command—that the district court “shall indicate” the issue that
raised a constitutional claim—did not satisfy the clear statement
101. 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012).
102. 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013).
103. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. at 647-48.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)-(3) (2012).
105. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. at 648-49.
106. Id. at 648 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006)).
107. Id. (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516). 
108. Id. at 649.
109. Id. (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)).
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515). 
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rule either.112 The Court found that for clear statement purposes
there was a difference between mandatory rules and jurisdictional
rules.113 Although jurisdictional rules are mandatory, not all manda-
tory prescriptions, “however emphatic,” are jurisdictional.114
The structure of AEDPA did not clearly indicate that Congress
had meant to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction. First, the
Court found it “telling” that the petitioner had no control over the
drafting of the COA.115 This “would only compound the ‘unfai[r]
prejudice’ resulting from the sua sponte dismissals and remands
that jurisdictional treatment would entail.”116 The Court also rejec-
ted the government’s proximity argument—that the placement of
section 2253(c)(3) in a jurisdictional section indicated that Congress
intended to affect jurisdiction.117 Text was the key: “Mere proximity
will not turn a rule that speaks in nonjurisdictional terms into a
jurisdictional hurdle.”118
The context of the indication requirement did not satisfy the clear
statement rule either. The Court rejected the government’s attempt
to analogize section 2253(c)(3)’s limitation to limitations on notices
of appeal.119 Cases interpreting the latter limitations to be jurisdic-
tional had no bearing on a certificate of appealability.120 The Court
also looked to the statutory purpose as part of its context analysis.
To treat section 2253(c)(3) as jurisdictional “would thwart Congress’
intent” to eliminate delays in AEDPA.121 A judge fulfills AEDPA’s
“gatekeeping function” by determining that a COA is warranted,
and any additional screening “would not outweigh the costs of
further delay from the extra layer of review.”122
112. Id. at 651; see also Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605, 611-12 (2010) (noting that
“shall” does not necessarily render a statutory deadline jurisdictional).
113. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. at 651.
114. Id. (quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1205 (2011)).
115. Id. at 649-50.
116. Id. at 650 (quoting Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202). The Court also found it anomalous
that a jurisdictional reading of the section would strip power from a panel of court of appeals
judges based on a COA that Congress empowered one court of appeals judge to grant. Id. 
117. Id. at 651.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 651-52.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 650. 
122. Id. 
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Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center reveals a Court that
is increasingly reluctant to find that any procedural requirement
comes with jurisdictional consequences.123 Auburn unanimously
held that the 180-day filing deadline for a healthcare provider to file
a challenge to a reimbursement decision with the Provider Reim-
bursement Review Board was nonjurisdictional.124 Once again, the
Court relied on its clear statement approach: absent a “clear state-
ment” from Congress, courts should treat procedural requirements
as nonjurisdictional.125 The language of the procedural requirement
was not “ ‘jurisdictional’ in tone.”126 The Court noted that it had
repeatedly held filing deadlines to be nonjurisdictional except where
countermanded by “a century’s worth of precedent and practice,”
treating the specific filing deadline as jurisdictional.127 Auburn was
not such a case.128 Auburn also rejected two rather compelling
statutory arguments: that the filing deadline was jurisdictional,
first, because it was placed among other jurisdictional provisions,
and second, because Congress elsewhere had indicated that benefic-
iary (but not provider) deadlines might be extended.129
Thaler and Auburn are the results of a three-decade effort to lend
more precision to the term jurisdiction. The Court’s methodology for
determining whether a procedural requirement is jurisdictional is
now well-established. First, the Court employs a clear statement
principle130 to determine whether the text “clearly states” that a
procedural requirement is “jurisdictional.”131 The Court then consid-
ers whether the structure of the statute compels a jurisdictional
123. See 133 S. Ct. 817, 828-29 (2013).
124. Id. at 828.
125. Id. at 824.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 825 (quoting Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 n.2 (2007)).
128. Id. at 825-26.
129. Id. at 825-27. Congress expressly provided elsewhere that other time limits were not
jurisdictional. When Medicare beneficiaries request the Secretary to reconsider a benefits
determination, the statute gives them a time limit of 180 days or “such additional time as the
Secretary may allow.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(D)(i) (2012); see also id. § 1395ff(b)(1)(D)(ii)
(permitting a Medicare beneficiary to request a hearing by the Secretary within “time limits”
the Secretary “shall establish in regulations”).
130. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. at 824.
131. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 163 (2010) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006)).
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conclusion.132 In particular, the Court considers whether the re-
quirement is located in the jurisdiction-granting provision, a finding
that would support jurisdictional scope,133 and whether there are
any other structural statutory factors, such as congressional excep-
tions to the precondition, that would suggest the statute does not
speak in jurisdictional terms.134 Finally, the Court considers context,
which can include past interpretations of the statute.135 If a clear
statement cannot be found in the text, structure, and context, the
Court ordinarily concludes—with several key exceptions discussed
below—that Congress did not intend for the provision to operate in
a jurisdictional fashion.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CLEAR STATEMENT APPROACH
The Supreme Court’s current requirement that Congress speak
clearly when it intends for a procedural requirement to be jurisdic-
tional is problematic. Jurisdiction is an area, like so many others,
in which clarity is a virtue. Scholars have applauded the Supreme
Court’s requirement that Congress speak clearly if it intends for a
provision to operate jurisdictionally.136 These scholars are right to
welcome the added clarity and precision found in the Court’s new
jurisdictional cases, but they fail to recognize the underlying defini-
tional shift and that the current clear statement rule does not serve
clarity’s clarion call.
First, the Supreme Court’s application of its clear statement rule
has been unpredictable, leaving Congress without guidance as to
what is required for a condition to be considered jurisdictional and
leading to seemingly arbitrary results.137 Indeed, the Supreme
Court’s description of the clear statement rule seems a contradiction
in terms: Congress must clearly say that a provision is jurisdic-
tional, but the Court may go on to consider context and past prece-
dent. Second, the Supreme Court has imposed its clear statement
132. Id. at 163-64. 
133. Id. at 164-65.
134. Id. at 165.
135. See, e.g., Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011). 
136. See Brown, supra note 8, at 51-52; Dodson, Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 67;
Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. Russell, supra note 5, at 642-43; Wasserman, Jurisdiction,
Merits, and Procedure, supra note 5, at 1548.
137. See infra Part II.B.
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rule retroactively, upsetting, rather than facilitating, congressional
dialogue.138 Third, the undertheorized clear statement rule is a poor
fit because the Supreme Court has not linked it to any important
constitutional value and because the rule itself implicates separa-
tion of powers concerns.139
A. The Scholarly Consensus
Scholars warmly approve of the Court’s requirement that Con-
gress speak clearly when it intends a statute to have jurisdictional
effect. They view the clear statement rule as a valuable tool in
implementing the Court’s more precise definition of jurisdiction.
Many would even go further than the contemporary Court, requir-
ing more for a provision to be found jurisdictional.
Scott Dodson has written extensively and impressively about
jurisdictional characterizations. Although in more recent years he
has questioned whether clarity as to jurisdiction is practically pos-
sible,140 Dodson nevertheless supports a “stringent clear statement
rule” for jurisdictional requirements.141 He argues that such a rule
would facilitate clarity and ensure that Congress has considered the
hardships that a jurisdictional bar might impose on litigants.142
Dodson would employ a presumption of jurisdictionality “only if
Congress makes the jurisdictional character ... unmistakably
clear.”143 In addition to supporting a “stringent clear statement
rule,” Dodson would go much further than the current Court in
some respects; even when Congress has been “unmistakably clear,”
his approach would permit courts nevertheless to override Congress
and find a provision nonjurisdictional.144
138. See infra Part II.C.
139. See infra Part II.D.
140. See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 37-38
(2011). 
141. Dodson, Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 66-67. 
142. See id.
143. Id. (emphasis added); see also Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. Russell, supra note 5,
at 644. 
144. Dodson, Removal Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 66-67. This so-called “escape hatch”
may turn out to be largely illusory. Dodson posits that it would apply when a jurisdictional
limit is unconstitutional and when the Court has otherwise indicated that the provision is not
jurisdictional. Id. at 67. The latter scenario should fail the clear statement rule in the first
instance, and the proper response from a reviewing Court confronted by a clear statement is
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Howard Wasserman is also persuaded that the Court’s clear
statement rule for jurisdiction is a good development, and he too
would go further than the current Court.145 Wasserman criticizes
the Arbaugh decision for leaving “open the possibility that Con-
gress” might make a “statutory element jurisdictional by clearly
labeling it as such.”146 He advocates instead for an absolute rule that
traditional merits issues—who the statute regulates or protects and
what it prohibits—can never be jurisdictional.147 With respect to
procedural requirements, Wasserman finds that “Arbaugh’s plain-
statement approach makes perfect sense .... Congress must be
meticulous, precise, and not unduly profligate in characterizing
rules as jurisdictional.”148
not to ignore the clear statement, but rather to strike down an unconstitutional statute.
Dodson’s approach would also allow courts to consider three considerations—functionality,
effects, and consistency with precedent—when a clear statement is absent. Id. at 66. These
additional factors somewhat diminish the importance of the clear statement rule, but because
the factors either track or add to the Court’s current approach, the approach would not
provide additional clarity or predictability.
145. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure, supra note 5 at 1548-49; Wasserman,
The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings,” supra note 5; see also Brown, supra note 8,
at 64-67 (supporting but proposing modifications to the clear statement rule). 
146. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings,” supra note 5, at 953. 
147. Id. at 953-54. In Wasserman’s view, this categorical distinction is warranted because
jurisdiction and merits involve the exercise of different congressional powers: jurisdiction, the
structural power of Congress to delineate federal courts’ jurisdiction; and merits,
constitutional powers (like the Commerce Clause) to create causes of action. Wasserman,
Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure, supra note 5, at 646. But the Supreme Court was surely
correct when it noted that Congress could have made the numerosity requirement
jurisdictional. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). That means that the
categories of jurisdiction and merits are not exclusive, but rather may overlap, and thus
Wasserman’s categorical approach may yield the wrong outcome. See Kevin M. Clermont,
Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 1018-19 (2006); cf. Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious
Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1613-14, 1620 (2003) (suggesting that there
is no real distinction between jurisdiction and merits because both deal with the legitimate
authority of a court).
148. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings,” supra note 5, at 960.
In undertaking this analysis, courts are to “focus their analysis on whether Congress has
defined a precondition as jurisdictional, whether it used jurisdictional language addressed to
the courts and their adjudicative authority, and whether Congress is serving structural or
individual values.” Id. This tracks the Supreme Court’s current practice.
Although Dodson and Wasserman are in favor of the clear statement rule, they propose
various modifications. These approaches are categorically different from the approach I
suggest because they take the clear statement rule as a starting point. As a result, these
approaches do not address either the Court’s inconsistent application or its undertheorization
of the clear statement rule. 
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B. The Clear Statement Approach Is Unpredictable
In regard to jurisdiction, certainty has much to recommend it, but
the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional clear statement rule obscures
the Court’s recent emphasis on definitional precision and leads to
unpredictable results. As Justice Scalia has explained:
It is hard enough to provide a uniform, objective answer to the
question whether a statute, on balance, more reasonably means
one thing than another. But it is virtually impossible to expect
uniformity and objectivity when there is added, on one or the
other side of the balance, a thumb of indeterminate weight.149
The one clear thing about the Supreme Court’s clear statement
approach is that the thumb is of indeterminate weight.
1. Bowles, John R., and Stare Decisis
Congress must speak clearly in the text of a statute to rebut the
substantive presumption a clear statement rule enforces—here, that
procedural requirements ordinarily are nonjurisdictional.150 Yet the
Court has repeatedly stated that past precedent might be proba-
tive and twice relied on prior precedent to conclude that a statute
has jurisdictional effect. 151 This haphazard application of stare
decisis  is inconsistent with the Court’s admonition that courts are
149. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 28 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
150. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 851 (4th ed. 2007) (“[C]lear statement rules ... are
presumptions that can only be rebutted by clear language in the text of the statute.”). This
is not to say that clear statement rules are themselves inconsistent with prior precedent. See
generally Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109
(2010) (describing the long historical roots of many commonly applied clear statement rules).
Although the Supreme Court has on one occasion noted that a clear statement rule “does not
prevail over ... stare decisis [when] applied to a longstanding statutory construction implica-
ting important reliance interests,” Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 206-07
(1991), the Court has not subsequently adhered to this ordering rule in jurisdictional (or
other) cases. In all events, stare decisis principles themselves have not applied to the Court’s
cursory consideration of the question. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
151. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008); Bowles v.
Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007).
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to carefully evaluate past jurisdictional precedent. It also suggests
a Court that does not feel constrained by its own clear statement
rule. As a result, the rule is anything but democracy reinforcing:
Congress has no idea what sort of clarity will be required in any
given case.
Two cases in particular demonstrate the unpredictability of the
Supreme Court’s clear statement approach. Arbaugh and its proge-
ny ask whether Congress “clearly state[d]” that a precondition to
suit is “jurisdictional.”152 Bowles v. Russell and John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States take a different approach: stare decisis
governed the surprising analysis in those cases.
In particular, Bowles involved 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)’s requirement
that a notice of appeal be filed within thirty days of a judgment.153
However, § 2107(c) of the same statute gives district courts limited
authority to grant a fourteen-day extension.154 The question in
Bowles was whether an appellant’s reliance on the district court’s
improper award of a seventeen-day extension deprived the appel-
late court of jurisdiction.155 With little textual analysis, and without
acknowledging the rule that Congress must “clearly state” its
jurisdictional intention, Bowles held that § 2107’s time limits were
jurisdictional.156 The Court rested its decision on grounds that first,
the time limits were statutory,157 and second, the Court “has long
held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is
‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’ ”158 But to say a requirement is stat-
utory says nothing about whether Congress intended it to operate
jurisdictionally.159 Thus, the Court’s decision ultimately rests on
precedent.160
John R. is another procedural requirements case decided on stare
decisis grounds.161 At issue was 28 U.S.C. § 2501, which provides
152. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006). 
153. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 207.
154. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2012).
155. Id. at 207-08.
156. Id. at 208-09, 214.
157. Id. at 210-11 (distinguishing rule-based cases). 
158. Id. at 209 (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per
curiam)). 
159. See id. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160. See id. at 209-10 (majority opinion).
161. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 134 (2008). Some commen-
tators have explained John R. away by noting that it did not actually decide whether the
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“[e]very claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims
has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed
within six years after such claim first accrues.”162 The government
had waived its statute-of-limitations defense in the district court
but nonetheless argued that the Court must address the question
sua sponte because the limitations requirement was “jurisdic-
tional.”163 As with Bowles, the John R. Court failed to engage with
Arbaugh’s clear statement approach. Instead, the Court focused
exclusively on prior precedent, noting that the petitioner could have
succeeded only by convincing the Court that it “has overturned, or
that it should now overturn ... earlier precedent.”164
The John R. Court’s failure to analyze the text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2501 is particularly troubling, as the Supreme Court previously
suggested that the statute was nonjurisdictional. In Irwin v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, the Court held that the thirty-day
filing deadline in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
subject to equitable tolling.165 Irwin not only established a presump-
tion of equitable tolling in suits against the federal government, but
in so doing, remarked that the “phraseology” of the Title VII
limitations statute was “very similar” to the statute at issue in John
R.166 And while the Irwin Court noted that the language in 28
U.S.C. § 2501 was arguably “more stringent,”167 the John R. Court
statute of limitations was jurisdictional, presumably because the Court used the term
“jurisdictional” in quotes. See Dodson, supra note 140, at 37 (noting that the Court called it
“more absolute” instead of “jurisdictional”); Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure,
supra note 5, at 1551 (noting that the Court never said the word jurisdiction). But the cases
that John R. relied upon used the term in its full sense and subsequent cases have recognized
the relationship. See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 197, 1203 (2011).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012).
163. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 132-33.
164. Id. at 136.
165. 498 U.S. 89, 94-96 (1990). The statute provides in relevant part:
Within 90 days of receipt of notice of final action taken by ... the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ... an employee or applicant for employment, if
aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final
action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of
this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (2012).
166. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 94-95; see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 137
(comparing statutes and noting that the Irwin Court had found them to be “linguistically
similar”).
167. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95.
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did not rely on this (or any other) textual difference.168 Acknowledg-
ing the statutes were textually similar, the Court distinguished
them because of “[b]asic principles of stare decisis.”169 The limita-
tions statutes were different “in the key respect that the Court had
not previously provided a definitive interpretation.”170 Even if the
government had not relied on prior cases, and the justifications for
stare decisis were therefore at their weakest, the Court concluded
that it was “more important that the applicable rule of law be
settled than that it be settled right.”171
The precedent-based rationale in Bowles and John R. creates
significant tension with the Court’s requirement that “the Legisla-
ture clearly state[ ] that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope
shall count as jurisdictional.”172 Indeed, the failure of the Bowles
and John R. opinions to consult congressional text gives the impres-
sion that the recent clear statement cases addressing the proper
meaning of jurisdiction do not exist. Yet the whole point of the clear
statement cases was that the Court had been “less than metic-
ulous,”173 even “profligate,”174 in its use of the term “jurisdiction,”
and reviewing courts were therefore required to reexamine and to
“bring some discipline” to cases in which preconditions to suit had
been called “jurisdictional.”175 The Court’s ad hoc approach to stare
decisis in the jurisdictional context—sometimes prior precedent is
168. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 137. Nor did the Court deal with the Irwin
Court’s conclusion that any “difference between [two statutes of limitations]” did not
“manifest a different congressional intent with respect to the availability of equitable
tolling”—a conclusion that would support a nonjurisdictional reading for both statutes. See
Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95.
169. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 139.
170. Id. at 137 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 139 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
172. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006)); see also id. at 171 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (recognizing “undeniable tension” between Bowles and Arbaugh); Dodson, The
Failure of Bowles v. Russell, supra note 5, at 643 (same). 
173. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004).
174. Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment,
Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67, 81 (2009).
175. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202-03 (2011); see also
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. at 507; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,
89 (1998).
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“key”176 and sometimes it is “not dispositive”177—leads to unpredict-
able results.
Recognizing this tension, the Court has recently sought to recon-
cile Bowles and John R. with the rest of its jurisdictional juris-
prudence, but those attempts have not resulted in a coherent
interpretive approach.178 In Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki,
the Court read John R.’s stare decisis holding in light of congressio-
nal intent.179 “Congress,” the Court wrote, “need not use magic
words” to speak clearly as to jurisdictionality: context, including
prior Supreme Court decisions, was important.180 Thus, “[w]hen ‘a
long line of this Court’s decisions left undisturbed by Congress,’ has
treated a similar requirement as ‘jurisdictional,’ we will presume
that Congress intended to follow that course.”181 In Union Pacific
Railroad v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen Gen-
eral Committee of Adjustment, Central Region, the Supreme Court
similarly sought to cabin Bowles’s stare decisis rationale, reinter-
preting that case as one “relying on a long line of this Court’s
decisions left undisturbed by Congress.”182
These post hoc rationalizations are in tension with other deci-
sions. In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, for example, the Court
concluded that 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)’s registration requirement for
copyrights was “nonjurisdictional, notwithstanding its prior juris-
dictional treatment.”183
176. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 137.
177. Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 169.
178. Although the Supreme Court has occasionally noted that the clear statement rule does
not prevail over stare decisis when “applied to a longstanding statutory construction
implicating important reliance interests,” Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 206-
07 (1991), stare decisis principles themselves do not apply to the Court’s cursory consideration
of the question. The Court has not sought to reconcile its decisions in Bowles or John R. on
that ground, protesting instead that they are compatible with a clear statement approach.
179. See Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1203.
180. Id.
181. Id. (citation omitted).
182. 558 U.S. 67, 82 (2009) (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-11 (2007)); see also
Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 173 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (reconciling decisions based on
congressional acquiescence).
183. Reed Elsevier, Inc., 559 U.S. at 169; see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101, 109 (2002) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2012) as a “charge filing
provision” rather than a jurisdictional element); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.
385, 393 (1982) (concluding that an EEOC filing requirement was nonjurisdictional, even
though Supreme Court decisions had characterized it as such).
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More fundamentally, the Supreme Court’s invocation of what
appears to be congressional acquiescence does not make its juris-
dictional jurisprudence any more consistent. At the outset, congres-
sional acquiescence is a shaky interpretive theory grounded in the
idea that Congress’s failure to reverse a judicial decision through
legislation indicates Congress’s approval of the Court’s interpreta-
tion.184 But Congress may fail to enact legislation for any number of
political and parliamentary reasons that have nothing to do with a
substantive endorsement of a Court decision.185 Congressional acqui-
escence also is difficult to square with the idea that it is the intent
of the enacting Congress that matters.186 Even among scholars sym-
pathetic to congressional acquiescence, the theory would not justify
the reasoning in Bowles and John R. because neither case involved
specific legislative consideration and rejection of a proposal.187 In the
184. See Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of
Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 184-86 (1989).
185. Id. at 186. Legislation is an effort to package competing ideals and compromises, and
the Constitution’s “complicated check on legislation”—bicameral agreement and an executive
signature—makes it difficult to determine the reason that Congress has not acted to reverse
a judicial decision. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
186. Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 840 (1988) (“It is the
intent of the Congress that enacted [the statute in question] that controls.” (quoting
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977))). Congressional acquiescence
treats a later Congress’s silence “as the functional equivalent of an affirmative congressional
enactment endorsing the [C]ourt’s earlier (now recognized as erroneous) decision.” Marshall,
supra note 184, at 188. Scholars have suggested a more dynamic theory of statutory interpre-
tation that “rejects the assumption of a canonical moment at which a statute is born and has
all and only the meaning it will ever have.” RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 348 (1986). See
generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67
(1988). The Court, however, has remained faithful to the requirement that the enacting
Congress is the one that matters.
187. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 186, at 69 (noting that when the Court finds meaning in
congressional inaction, it usually “points to specific legislative consideration of the issue and,
either implicitly or explicitly, indicates that Congress’ failure to act bespeaks a probable
intent to reject the alternative(s)”); see also Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946)
(“It is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling
rule of law.”); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (“It would require very
persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence to debar this Court from re-
examining its own doctrines.”). Professor Marshall similarly notes, “the great majority of
cases invoking a strong rule of statutory stare decisis have either pointed to actual evidence
that members of Congress were aware of the earlier decision, or have presumed that the
matter decided was so newsworthy that it is inconceivable that Congress was unaware of it.”
Marshall, supra note 184, at 185 (footnotes omitted).
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face of congressional silence, the Court instead assumed acquies-
cence.188
Although judicial decisions may form part of the backdrop against
which Congress legislates,189 the Supreme Court has not sought to
reconcile its decisions in Bowles and John R. based on such a ration-
ale, but rather on the (discredited) idea that congressional intent
can be gleaned from silence.190 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
been willing to overturn prior precedents, precedents which also
form the background against which Congress legislated. Under the
Court’s current clear statement rule, it is difficult to predict when
the Court might exalt precedent over the clear statement rule.
Statutory stare decisis is sometimes defended on institutional
competence or separation of powers grounds rather than congres-
sional acquiescence.191 This more compelling rationale posits that
policy making is the province of the legislature, and because
statutory interpretation requires the resolution of statutory ambigu-
ity, some degree of policy making is inherent in judicial interpreta-
tion.192 As a result, stare decisis should govern once a court has
interpreted a statute because Congress is the appropriate branch to
alter such an interpretation.193 The separation of powers rationale
has much to recommend it,194 yet there is little to indicate that the
188. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2001) (“When ‘a long
line of this Court’s decisions left undisturbed by Congress,’ has treated a similar requirement
as ‘jurisdictional,’ we will presume that Congress intended to follow that course.” (emphasis
added) (citation omitted)).
189. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1991)
(explaining the presumption that Congress intends for well-established common law
principles to apply to its legislation).
190. See Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1203.
191. See generally Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317 (2005). As Professor Barrett explains, the Supreme Court has
suggested two reasons why Congress is the better institution to change a statutory precedent:
resource allocation and constitutional structure. Id. at 324-27. The former is “unsatisfying,”
as Congress may not be the more efficient actor and because efficiency seems a weak ground
on which to rest interpretive power. Id. at 324-25.
192. Id. at 325-27 (describing the arguments made by Justice Hugo Black and Professor
Lawrence Marshall); see also Marshall, supra note 184, at 201-07.
193. Barrett, supra note 191, at 325-27; see also Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union,
Local 700, 398 U.S. 236, 256-57 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that adhering to
statutory precedent “avoid[s] encroaching on the power of Congress to determine policies and
make laws to carry them out”).
194. See Barrett, supra note 191, at 325-27.
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Supreme Court meant to rely on this rationale instead of on infer-
ences from congressional silence.195
Ultimately, the Court’s invocation of statutory stare decisis (on
any grounds) is unwarranted in Bowles and John R. because those
cases lie at the heart of an exception to stare decisis principles.
When a precedent does not reflect considered deliberation, stare
decisis—much less stare decisis based on congressional silence—
does not ordinarily preclude a court from thoroughly considering the
issue for the first time.196 The Supreme Court’s decisions on juris-
diction have not always been carefully considered.197 In Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, the Court expressly recognized
that many of its jurisdictional decisions were not entitled to
precedential effect because they were not products of thorough
deliberation.198 In sum, Bowles and John R. are outliers in which the
Court chose not to invoke its new clear statement rule but to rely
instead on prior precedent.
Bowles also illustrates that the Court’s application of its claims-
processing distinction has led to arbitrary results. The Court has
defined claims-processing rules as “rules that seek to promote the
orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take
certain procedural steps at certain specified times.”199 Yet even
though the rule that appeals must be filed within thirty days of a
judgment fits that definition precisely—it is a rule that requires
parties to “take certain procedural steps at certain specified times”
and thus promotes “the orderly progress of litigation”200—the Bowles
195. See Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1203 (looking for indicators of congressional intent). To
the extent the Court has cited authority for the principle of congressional acquiescence in its
recent opinions, the Court has hewn closely to the language of Henderson. See Union Pac.
R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558
U.S. 67, 82 (2009) (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-11 (2007)); see also Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 173-74 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (reconciling
decisions based on congressional acquiescence).
196. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1369
(1988) (“The willingness of the Supreme Court to reconsider statutory precedents depends
upon: (1) the thoroughness of the Court’s consideration of the issue in the precedent; (2) the
degree to which Congress has left development of the statutory scheme to the courts; and (3)
the degree to which the precedent has generated public and private reliance.”).
197. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510-11 (2006).
198. 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998).
199. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1203. 
200. Id.
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Court held that the filing of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional
limitation.201 Acknowledging that filing deadlines are “quintessen-
tial claim-processing rules” that “ordinarily are not jurisdictional,”202
the Supreme Court has sought to distinguish Bowles as an “excep-
tional one” in which past precedent and practice “rank [the] time
limit as jurisdictional.”203 Whether past precedent and practice is
sufficient to overcome the Court’s presumption in favor of jurisdic-
tion, however, is anyone’s guess as the Court has at other times
been very willing to overturn past jurisdictional precedents.
C. The Clear Statement Approach Is Retroactive
Clear statement rules often are justified on grounds that they
promote dialogue between the legislative and judicial branches.204
However, the Supreme Court’s clear statement rule for jurisdiction
does not promote this sort of clarity because it often applies retro-
actively, thereby compromising “the reliability of background expec-
tations that are essential to effective communication between
Congress and the judiciary.”205
From the Marshall Court through at least the mid-nineteenth
century, courts were likely to view procedural requirements as
jurisdictional.206 Beginning in the late 1990s, the Supreme Court
narrowed its definition of jurisdiction, and in so doing, reversed that
presumption. Arbaugh’s clear statement principle now enforces a
more limited view of the term jurisdiction. The Court presumes that
Congress intended a condition to suit to operate nonjurisdictionally,
unless Congress clearly says otherwise.207 The Court has held all
sorts of preexisting procedural requirements to be nonjurisdictional,
even those previously labeled “jurisdictional.”208 In fact, the Court’s
201. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007). 
202. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 819 (2013) (quoting Henderson, 131
S. Ct. at 1203).
203. Id. at 825.
204. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 399, 401 (2010).
205. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 287-303 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (describing the
Court’s shifting approach in dealing with implied private rights of action).
206. See Castro v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 46, 49 (1865).
207. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648-49 (2012).
208. Id. at 648.
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narrowing of the scope of the term jurisdiction has been so disrup-
tive to prior precedent that Justice Scalia (the author of Steel Co.
and its mandate to bring some discipline to jurisdictional cases)
remarked that the Supreme Court’s new presumption “shows signs
of becoming a libertine, liberating romp through [the Court’s] estab-
lished jurisprudence.”209
There is no question that the Court’s methodological approach
has changed dramatically from the Marshall Court to the Taney
Court to the current Court. But can the different approaches be
explained by the different consequences that attached to a jurisdic-
tional statute at different times in our history? The Supreme Court
has used the term jurisdiction to mean different things at different
times. For example, the federal courts did not generally treat juris-
diction rigidly until around 1900,210 and Michael Collins argues that
“certain of the qualities commonly associated with” limited subject
matter jurisdiction “remained less than fully settled throughout
much of the nation’s history.”211
Although the Supreme Court’s changing conception of jurisdiction
may blunt the effects of its clear statement rule, the rule often
operates retroactively because it is only in the last few decades that
the Court retreated from the view that procedural requirements are
often jurisdictional. Yet the consequences we ordinarily associate
with jurisdiction, namely nonwaivability, attended jurisdictional
statutes well before the Court’s clear statement rule.
In the 1868 case of Edmonson v. Bloomshire, the plaintiffs had
failed to timely file the record with the Supreme Court.212 The
jurisdictional objection was first raised at oral argument.213 The
Supreme Court dismissed despite the fact that both parties had
fully argued the case on the merits and counsel never objected to the
regularity of the appeal.214 The Court rejected the argument that a
motion to dismiss was required before the case proceeded to a
209. Id. at 663 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1, 99-105 (1994); Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1452 (2011).
211. Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 1831 (2007);
see also William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807 (2008).
212. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 306, 311 (1868).
213. Id. at 308.
214. Id.
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hearing.215 The reason, the Court wrote, “is, that the writ of error
and the appeal are the foundations of our jurisdiction, without
which we have no right to revise the action of the inferior court.”216
The Court “ha[d] never hesitated” to dismiss a case on such grounds
“although no motion to dismiss was made by either party.”217 “In
fact, treating it as a matter involving the jurisdiction of the court,
we cannot do otherwise.”218
The retroactivity of the clear statement approach is confirmed by
prior case law rejecting the efficiency rationale that currently
animates that approach. Despite the serious consequences that at-
tended a jurisdictional ruling by at least 1868, the mid-nineteenth-
century Court did not view inconvenience, a waste of time and effort
on the part of litigants or courts, or even unfairness to blameless
litigants, as grounds upon which to conclude that a statutory pre-
condition to suit was nonjurisdictional. As the Edmonson Court put
it: “it is better, if the rule is deemed unwise or inconvenient, to
resort to the legislature for its correction.”219
Even as early as 1848, the Court dismissed concerns over incon-
venience or unfairness as irrelevant to a jurisdictional question.220
In United States v. Curry, Thomas Curry had been awarded land
under a statute enabling land claimants within the new state of
Louisiana to institute proceedings in federal district court to prove
the validity of their colonial land claims.221 The statute provided
that an appeal to the Supreme Court must be brought within one
year of the district court decision.222 But the district court, in
215. Id. at 310.
216. Id. 
217. Id.; see also Credit Co. v. Ark. Cent. Ry. Co., 128 U.S. 258, 261 (1888) (dismissing
untimely appeal sua sponte).
218. Edmonson, 74 U.S. at 310.
219. Id. at 311; see also Ins. Co. of the Valley of Va. v. Mordecai, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 195, 202
(1858). In Mordecai, the Court “dismissed for want of jurisdiction” a case in which petitioner
had committed no error. Mordecai, 62 U.S. at 202. The lower court clerk, through no fault of
the appealing party, had used an outdated writ of error that misstated the date of the first
day of the Supreme Court’s term. Id. at 196-97. Because the “legal return day” was a
jurisdictional requirement fixed by statute, the Court dismissed the case without considering
fairness or the waste of time and effort on the part of the litigant. Id. at 200.
220. United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106, 113 (1848).
221. Id. at 106.
222. Id. at 107 (“[I]n all cases the party against whom the judgment or decree of said
District Court may be finally given shall be entitled to an appeal, within one year from the
time of its rendition, to the Supreme Court of the United States.” (quoting Act of May 26,
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accordance with local Louisiana law, granted an extension of time
in which to file an appeal.223 The government perfected its appeal to
the Supreme Court within the time granted by the extension, but
beyond the one-year limitation.224 The Supreme Court found that
the government’s reliance on the district court order was irrelevant
to the jurisdictional question because the appeal had not been
prosecuted “in the manner directed, within the time limited by the
acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”225 As
for the government’s argument that application of the limitations
statute would work an “inconvenience or injustice,” Congress alone
determined the manner in which a case must be brought before the
Court and thus only Congress could provide relief.226
In sum, the Supreme Court’s clear statement rule has changed
the way the Court analyzes whether a procedural requirement is
jurisdictional. This change in approach means that the clear state-
ment rule often may operate contrary to congressional expectations.
The point here is not that statutes necessarily should be interpreted
according to the principles in place at the time of their enactment,227
but the narrower observation that the Supreme Court’s new clear
statement rule for jurisdictional provisions is not democracy enforc-
ing. Thus, although clear statement rules are often justified because
they facilitate legislative and judicial communication, the Court’s
clear statement rule for jurisdiction cannot be defended upon clarity
grounds because it often applies retroactively, compromising the
background expectations necessary for effective communication
between Congress and the judiciary.228
1824, ch. 95, § 2, 4 Stat. 52, 53)).
223. Id. at 110-11.
224. Id. at 113.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. The Court often interprets statutes according to then-existing principles of inter-
pretation. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 205, at 705-08 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s rejection of prior case law liberally inferring private rights of action). The tension
between stare decisis and new interpretive approaches deserves further research, but is
beyond the scope of this Article, except to the extent this tension discredits the notion that
this particular clear statement rule promotes clarity.
228. Id. at 707.
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D. Separation of Powers Concerns
The clear statement rule for jurisdiction is undertheorized. Such
a rule is a powerful tool in the statutory interpretation arsenal; it
alters the usual mode of statutory interpretation and should not be
imposed without serious consideration. This Section first briefly
discusses how clear statement rules operate and then demonstrates
that even a forward-looking rule that is consistently applied will be
problematic for two reasons: (1) the Court has not tied it to a specific
constitutional interest and (2) the rule itself implicates separation
of powers concerns.
1. Clear Statement Background
As Professor Eskridge explains, clear statement rules are the
strongest form of interpretive presumption employed by the
courts.229 They are a type of “substantive canon” that commands a
particular statutory meaning unless Congress has clearly rejected
that meaning in the text of the statute.230 Clear statement rules
require a court to depart from ordinary judicial review. For a statute
to reach a certain result, it is not enough that the best reading of the
statute provide for such result.231 Rather, a particular substantive
interpretation is commanded unless Congress “unequivocally ex-
press[ed]” a contrary intention in the text of the statute.232
Supporters argue that clear statement rules are democracy
enforcing.233 Such rules permit the Court to police constitutional
boundaries without taking the extraordinary step of invalidating a
federal statute.234 Because clear statement rules are procedural,
rather than a judgment regarding the substantive legitimacy of a
229. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 150, at 884.
230. Id.
231. Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive
Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1283 (2002); see also Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
232. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 242.
233. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 631 (1992)
(“[U]ltimately such rules may even be democracy-enhancing.”).
234. Manning, supra note 204, at 402. 
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congressional act, they are reversible.235 Congress may override the
Supreme Court’s clear statement decisions if it speaks clearly. This
override authority requires Congress to “focus[ ] the political process
on the values enshrined in the Constitution” and tempers the
Court’s dialogue with the political branches, leaving lawmaking
authority with the democratic branches.236
Clear statement rules are not without their critics.237 Yet even
assuming the validity of clear statement rules in general, they are
an aberration from ordinary principles of judicial review. Such a
departure is not warranted when the clear statement rule at issue
does not protect a sufficiently specific constitutional interest, and
engenders constitutional concerns of its own.
2. The Court Has Not Invoked a Specific Constitutional Value
Since clear statement rules direct courts to something other than
the most reasonable reading of a statute,238 they are usually re-
served for constitutional values.239 Clear statement rules crop up in
a variety of contexts, but they operate primarily to preserve consti-
tutional principles. As John Manning puts it, clear statement rules
“share the defining feature of trying to safeguard constitutional
values.”240
235. Coenen, supra note 231, at 1287.
236. Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 233.
237. In addition to being countermajoritarian, Professor Manning argues that clear state-
ment rules also trench upon the authority of the democratically elected branches because they
extend constitutional limitations beyond constitutional bounds. Manning, supra note 204, at
402. Clear statement rules do not require the Court to find that Congress actually acted
outside its constitutional powers; the rules apply to patently constitutional statutes. In other
words, clear statement rules enforce a “judge-made penumbra” around constitutional val-
ues—limiting otherwise constitutional exercises of congressional authority. Id. at 402, 417.
As such, these “quasi-constitutional rules” pose serious questions about the authority of courts
to rewrite democratically accountable legislation on the basis of a constitutional emanation.
Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 233, at 637. Critics argue also that clear statement rules
emphasize certain structural values more than those grounded in individual rights. ESKRIDGE,
JR. ET AL., supra note 150, at 804; Manning, supra note 204, at 402.
238. Manning, supra note 204, at 402; see ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 150, at 638. 
239. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1991); ESKRIDGE,
JR. ET AL., supra note 150, at 884; see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory
Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1019 (1989).
240. Manning, supra note 204, at 402.
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Structural federalism, for example, has inspired the Supreme
Court to require Congress to “unequivocally express” its intention
when it acts to abrogate state sovereign immunity.241 Because the
Constitution did not contemplate federal jurisdiction over citizen
suits against nonconsenting States,242 the federal courts must be
certain of Congress’s intent to override the guarantees of the Elev-
enth Amendment.243 And while a State may waive its own sovereign
immunity, the “test for determining whether a State has waived its
immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one.”244
Consent to suit must be “unequivocally expressed,”245 and “will be
strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.”246
This pursuit is not without its ambiguities. The Supreme Court
has indicated that something less than a constitutional value might
give rise to a clear statement rule, and constitutional justifications
for various substantive canons are often attenuated and offered
after the fact.247 Further, as Professor Amy Barrett points out, other
substantive canons, like Charming Betsy and the avoidance canon,
may function like clear statement rules by permitting courts to
adopt less plausible statutory meanings based on nonconstitutional
values.248
241. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
242. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002); Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); see also Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1657
(2011).
243. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (“[I]f Congress intends to alter the
usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make
its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” (quoting Will v. Mich.
Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Pennhurst
II, 465 U.S. at 121. The Eleventh Amendment clear statement rule applies equally to
congressional dictates applied pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Nev.
Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003), and to Spending Clause legislation,
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 451 U.S. 1, 17, 24-25 (1981).
244. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675
(1999) (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)). 
245. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 99.
246. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996); see also Sossamon, 131 S. Ct. at 1657-58. 
247. For example, the Supreme Court referenced clear statement rules that operated for
nonconstitutional values (“constitutional or otherwise”), such an application traces to a
question of a statute’s extraterritorial effect, a question of some constitutional dimension. See
Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1991) (citations omitted).
248. Barrett, supra note 150, at 167 (discussing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804)). 
2066 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:2027
Still, the Supreme Court has by and large adhered to the notion
that clear statement rules ordinarily operate to preserve constitu-
tional values. And for good reason. As Professor Barrett notes,
“insofar as any canon permits a departure from a text’s most natur-
al meaning, that departure must be reconciled with the constitu-
tional structure.”249 When a canon is constitutionally derived, it is
more easily harmonized with the understanding that courts are to
be the faithful agents of Congress. If a conflict between a statute
and the Constitution exists, courts must side with the Constitu-
tion.250 Further, although statutory alterations made on the basis of
undifferentiated social values risk undoing the legislative bargain
in unanticipated ways, these concerns are lessened when a substan-
tive canon draws on a specific constitutional value.251
The constitutional origin of a clear statement rule has value even
for dynamic statutory interpreters who may be less bothered by the
use of substantive canons to express policies different from those
embodied in a statute. Instead of pursuing an undefined set of social
values, constitutionally derived canons draw from an identifiable set
of norms.252 The constitutional origin of such canons thus leads to
more predictable judicial decisions.
In creating a clear statement requirement for jurisdictional
statutes, the Supreme Court has not invoked any constitutional in-
terest, but rather concerns over the time and expense of litigation.253
Because jurisdictional defects may be raised at any time during a
lawsuit, a late-breaking jurisdictional issue may mean that “months
of work on the part of the attorneys and the court may be wasted.”254
Because jurisdiction may require dismissal of a case after great
expense and effort,255 the Supreme Court has cautioned that courts
249. Id. at 111.
250. Id. at 181-82.
251. Id. at 168.
252. Id.
253. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012); see also Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013) (exemplifying how clear statement jurisdictional rules can
prevent the waste of adjudicatory resources); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131
S. Ct. 1197, 1201 (2011) (“Jurisdictional rules may ... result in the waste of judicial resources
and may unfairly prejudice litigants.”).
254. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. at 648 (quoting Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202).
255. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202 (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 508
(2006)).
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should not lightly attach “drastic” jurisdictional consequences to
preconditions to suit.256
Judicial economy, however important, seems a strange ground on
which to rest a clear statement rule for jurisdiction. Time and
expense are not constitutional principles257 or the sort of “weighty
and constant values” that have been used to validate substantive
preferences in statutory interpretation.258 The Supreme Court has
long held that “neither the convenience of the litigants nor consider-
ations of judicial economy” warrants an expansive interpretation of
Article III jurisdiction.259 For example, in United States v. Curry, the
government relied upon an erroneous lower court order to dismiss
the appeal.260 Even still, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the
government’s argument that application of a limitations statute
would work an “inconvenience or injustice.”261 Only Congress could
provide relief from a jurisdictional requirement.262
Although the Supreme Court has not identified any ground other
than economy for its jurisdictional clarity rule, scholars will point
to an important interest in access to the federal courts. In this vein,
it is worth noting that the Court has adopted a number of pre-
sumptions in favor of judicial review. First, the Supreme Court pre-
sumes that judicial review of final agency action “will not be cut off
unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the pur-
pose of Congress.”263 Thus, even before passage of the Administrative
256. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. at 648 (citing Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202). 
257. See Manning, supra note 204, at 403 (specifying separation of powers and federalism
as the types of constitutional principles clear statement rules are intended to protect).
258. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991).
259. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 552 (1989) (quoting Owen Equip. & Erection Co.
v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978)); see also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Co., 486
U.S. 800, 818 (1988); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379 (1981); Kline
v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922); Case of the Sewing Mach. Cos., 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 553, 577-78, 586-87 (1874); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850); Cary v.
Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845); McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504, 506 (1813).
260. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106, 112-13 (1848).
261. Id. at 113.
262. See, e.g., Finley, 490 U.S. at 556; Christianson, 486 U.S. at 814; Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 378; Kline, 260 U.S. at 234; Case of the Sewing Mach. Cos., 85 U.S.
at 559-60; Sheldon, 49 U.S. at 442; Cary, 44 U.S. at 245; McIntire, 11 U.S. at 506.
263. Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) (quoting Abbott
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99
(1977)); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298
(2001); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 496 (1991); Eskridge, Jr. &
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Procedure Act,264 the Court insisted that Congress clearly indicate
a desire to omit judicial review of agency action.265 Second, because
Article III vests the whole of the “judicial Power” in the Supreme
Court and in the lower courts Congress creates, the Supreme Court
has held that Congress may withdraw traditional equitable powers
only by making that desire plain.266 Third, the Supreme Court pre-
sumes that Congress will not preclude all judicial review of constitu-
tional questions.267
These judicial review presumptions reveal an overarching policy
in favor of judicial review, and some might argue that a thumb on
the scale is necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
After all, it is a hallmark of the American judicial system that a
litigant ordinarily is entitled to her day in court.
Yet differences exist between the various presumptions in favor
of judicial review and the Court’s recent clear statement rule. To be
sure, both presumptions and clear statement rules may deviate from
a faithful agency norm by substituting a plausible interpretation of
a statute for the most natural one.268 But presumptions place a
lighter hand on the interpretive scale at least in the sense that they
may be rebutted by any indicator of congressional intent—such as
text, structure, context, purpose, and legislative history.269 On the
other hand, clear statement rules ordinarily foreclose extrinsic
Frickey, supra note 233, at 601.
264. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
5 U.S.C.).
265. See Gardner, 387 U.S. at 140.
266. Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 233, at 605 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
321, 330 (1944) (“[I]f Congress desired to make such an abrupt departure from traditional
equity practice ... it would have made its desire plain.”)); see Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305, 319 (1982).
267. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 150, at 883. As Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603
(1988), taught, “where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims
its intent to do so must be clear.” See also Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 767 (1975). The
Court imposes this “heightened showing in part to avoid the ‘serious constitutional question’
that would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable
constitutional claim.” Webster, 486 U.S. at 603 (quoting Bowen, 476 U.S. at 681 n.12).
268. See Barrett, supra note 150, at 167. 
269. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 150, at 884 (“[A]ny potential evidence of statutory
meaning (e.g., statutory text, legislative history, statutory purposes, policy arguments, and
so on) [may be used] to rebut the presumption.”); see Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.
Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1991) (contrasting clear statement and presumptions).
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guides to interpretation270 and compel a particular substantive
interpretation unless Congress has issued a clear statement in the
text of a statute.271
Second, and more critically, each of the judicial review presump-
tions serves to protect a specific constitutional value. The presump-
tion in favor of judicial review of final agency action stems from a
concern over Article I adjudication.272 The presumption in favor of
the exercise of all facets of the “judicial Power” is derived from
Article III’s vesting clause.273 The presumption in favor of judicial
review of constitutional questions enforces separation of powers
concerns over congressional jurisdiction stripping.274
Although access to courts is of undoubted value in our legal sys-
tem,275 and one might be able to make an attenuated constitutional
connection—for example, that Congress may neither take away all
access nor every avenue of appellate review276—a broad and general
interest in federal court access is not a very specific constitutional
value upon which to hang a clear statement clarity tax. Other
specific constitutional guarantees, like the Due Process Clause, exist
to protect many of the values one might associate with court access.
It is thus no surprise that, for centuries, procedural requirements,
like statutes of limitations or filing deadlines, have not generally
been viewed to effectuate the sort of denial to court access that the
Constitution might prohibit.277
270. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting),
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012), as recognized in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U.S. 500 (2006).
271. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 150, at 884.
272. See Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1287 (2014).
273. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a “Unified Judiciary,” 75
TEX. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2000).
274. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Same-Sex Marriage, the Constitution, and Congressional
Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: Be Careful What You Wish For, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 363, 369 (2005).
275. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (describing the fundamental right of
access to courts).
276. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85
(1869).
277. See Barrett, supra note 150, at 167. As Barrett argues, a deviation from the norm of
faithful agency cannot be justified simply because a substantive canon can somehow be
connected to a constitutional value; courts must carefully consider the specificity of the value
stake. Id. at 181-82.
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Perhaps for these reasons, the Supreme Court has made no effort
to tie its novel clear statement rule to anything more than judicial
economy. That justification has never been enough to expand the
jurisdiction of the federal courts—it falls short of the sort of weighty
and important consideration that the Court generally has required
of its clear statement rules.
3. The Article I Problem
A clear statement rule mandating that courts construe statutes
broadly in favor of their own jurisdiction implicates separation of
powers problems. As the Supreme Court has explained, statutory
limits on jurisdiction “are an essential ingredient of separation and
equilibration of powers.”278 Although there is robust academic de-
bate over what limits the Constitution places on congressional
control of federal court jurisdiction,279 there is little doubt that, so
278. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998) (citing United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974)); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974).
279. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 205, at 287-303 (describing the contending
positions); see, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1034, 1038 (1982) (explaining that Congress has plenary power
over lower federal courts and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court); Gerald Gunther,
Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 899-900
(1984) (same); John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 209 (1997) (same); Martin H. Redish,
Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction, 77 NW.
U. L. REV. 143, 145 (1982) (explaining why Congress may limit jurisdiction of lower federal
courts); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1004-05
(1965) (explaining that Congress may define the jurisdiction of the lower courts and the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court); see also Peter J. Smith, Textualism and
Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1885-86 (2008) (describing the academic debate); cf.
Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741,
748-49 (1984) (arguing Congress must grant federal jurisdiction over every type of case in
Article III); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 504 (1974) (contending Congress may not abolish lower federal
courts); James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitu-
tionality of Jurisdiction Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 238 (2007) (contending
the Supreme Court must be granted authority to review state court judgments when the state
court acts as a federal tribunal); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial
Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929, 956-57
(1982) (arguing that the Supreme Court must control uniformity of federal law); Lawrence
Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on
Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17,
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long as a jurisdiction-limiting provision does not violate an inde-
pendent provision of the Constitution, Congress may exercise sig-
nificant control over the jurisdiction of Article III courts. The Court’s
clear statement rule conflicts with the Court’s obligation of faithful
agency, manifest here in deference to Congress’s authority to deter-
mine federal jurisdiction.
Article III, Section 1, of the United States Constitution provided:
“the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.”280 Section 2 adds that Con-
gress may grant the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction “with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.”281 As the Supreme Court has held,282 and commentators
noted, these provisions “vest[ ] Congress both with virtually plenary
power over lower federal court jurisdiction ... and with substantial
power over Supreme Court jurisdiction and remedial authority.”283
The lower federal courts almost did not survive the Constitution-
al Convention. Edmund Randolph originally proposed as part of
the Virginia Plan that the judicial branch “consist of One supreme
tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals.”284 Yet the delegates
voted to delete the provision providing for “inferior tribunals.”285
Madison then offered a compromise resolution, which provided: “The
National Legislature [should] be empowered” to “institute inferior
tribunals.”286 According to Madison, there was a distinction “be-
tween establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discre-
21-22 (1981) (same).
280. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
281. Id. § 2, cl. 2.
282. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“[H]aving a right to prescribe
[jurisdiction], Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the
enumerated controversies.”); see also Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004) (“Only
Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”) (citing U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-13 (1868) (upholding
sweeping congressional exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court). 
283. Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 233, at 605; Manning, supra note 204, at 436
(“Article III ... expresses a basic value of substantial congressional control over the available
jurisdiction of the federal courts.”).
284. MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 95 (1911).
285. Id. at 118.
286. Id.
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tion to the Legislature to establish or not establish them.”287 The
Madisonian Compromise encountered resistance from state dele-
gates concerned about preserving the authority of the state courts
but ultimately was accepted by the Committee of the Whole.288 The
Committee of Detail then reported out a draft providing that the
judicial power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior Court as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be
constituted by the Legislature of the United States.”289
The Ratification Debates again focused on the potential for lower
federal courts to encroach on traditional state prerogatives. Among
the most popular amendments were those to eliminate all lower fed-
eral courts of first instance and to restrict original federal juris-
diction to a Supreme Court with little original jurisdiction.290 The
eventual acceptance of the Madisonian Compromise is generally
understood to permit Congress to create lower federal courts with
limited jurisdiction.291 The actions of the First Congress bear this
understanding out. The Judiciary Act of 1789 fell far short of vest-
ing the federal courts with the full breadth of jurisdiction authorized
by the Constitution.292 For example, Congress provided no general
federal question jurisdiction in the lower federal courts until 1875.293
Article III’s limitation on the appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court—“with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make”294—is also understood to grant Con-
gress wide berth. The provision emerged for the first time in the
report of the Committee of Detail and was accepted without discus-
sion.295 The First Congress took the Exceptions and Regulations
Clause seriously. The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court
287. Id. at 125.
288. Id. at 124-25; Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control
the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA.
L. REV. 45, 54 (1975).
289. The Committee of Style altered the language to its current form. See JULIUS GOEBEL,
JR., ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 246 (1971).
290. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. REV. 49, 56 (1923).
291. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 205, at 275; FARRAND, supra note 284, at 124-28.
292. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
293. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 205, at 276. Congress did briefly enact federal question
jurisdiction but rescinded it in 1801. See Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89.
294. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
295. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 205, at 287-303 (describing the contending positions).
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appellate jurisdiction over federal question cases arising from the
state courts only when those courts had denied the federal right.296
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court did not initially
extend to cases in which the federal claim had been upheld.297
Further, it was not until 1891 that the Supreme Court possessed
appellate authority to review the majority of federal court decisions
in criminal cases.298
In short, the convention and ratification debates confirm that the
text of the Constitution vests Congress with broad authority to
regulate the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the appel-
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Court’s clear statement
rule for procedural requirements is suspect because it interferes
with the Court’s obligation to faithfully interpret legislation, impos-
ing instead a substantive canon that tilts the balance in favor of
judicial review.
The Court’s newest interpretive rule is of a piece with the Court’s
long history of aggressively interpreting jurisdictional statutes in
the service of values like judicial economy. An overburdened Court
has sometimes narrowly interpreted jurisdictional grants to con-
tract its jurisdiction. Other times the Court has broadly interpreted
jurisdictional grants to expand its jurisdiction. From staples like the
well-pleaded complaint rule299 to the complete diversity rule300—nei-
ther of which appear on the face of the statutory text—to the
various abstention doctrines,301 the Supreme Court has often con-
tracted jurisdiction to manage its docket or promote federalism.302
296. Id. at 276-77.
297. Id. at 277.
298. Id. The Supreme Court exercised much of the same supervisory authority through its
habeas power. See generally James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic
Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2062 (1992).
299. Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdic-
tional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1332-37 (1986) (arguing that the language and history of statutory and
constitutional arising under jurisdiction language suggest that the rule is founded solely on
court-made jurisdictional policies of federalism and docket pressures).
300. Id. at 1300 n.30.
301. Id. at 1337-42 (arguing that the abstention doctrines allow courts to refuse or defer
cases within their statutory jurisdiction on grounds of judicial economy and federalism).
302. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Statutory Interpretation in the Context of Federal Jurisdiction,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 52, 56-59 (2007); see also F. Andrew Hessick III, The Common Law of
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 60 ALA. L. REV. 895, 895 (2009) (describing the Court’s
expansion and contraction of federal jurisdiction without regard to congressional intent);
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As Matasar and Bruch ably explain, the adequate and independent
state grounds doctrine, for example, is not required by the Constitu-
tion or any current statute.303 It arises only from the Court’s self-
restraint,304 as do a number of the Court’s rules that limit its
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court’s clear statement rule for procedural require-
ments is not unique in expansively interpreting a jurisdictional
grant. Pre-Finley the Court was willing to infer that Congress had
conferred jurisdiction because it was not precluded by statute.305
The Court’s aggressive interpretation of the statutes governing its
jurisdiction raises distinct interpretive issues. In interpreting these
statutes, the federal courts are deciding the bounds of their own
power, implicating fundamental separation of powers issues. It is
well established that in the absence of a congressional grant of ju-
risdiction, an Article III court has no constitutional authority—any
action is ultra vires.306 This requirement “spring[s] from the nature
and limits of the judicial power of the United States.”307 As Charles
Black puts it, congressional control over an unelected judiciary is
“the rock on which rests the legitimacy of the judicial work in a
democracy.”308 To allow a court to assume jurisdiction, and to bind
parties, when the best reading of a statutory provision suggests that
the Court does not in fact have jurisdiction is antithetical to these
principles.
In 1805, Chief Justice Marshall rejected the similar argument
that the Court should presume that jurisdiction exists “unless there
Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1883 (2008) (arguing
that textualist judges have not always followed the faithful agency norm in interpreting
jurisdictional statutes).
303. Matasar & Bruch, supra note 299, at 1322-23.
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810); Ex parte
Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807).
306. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101-02 (1997).
307. Id. at 94-95 (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). 
308. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 846
(1975); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent conception of the role of courts in
statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the legislature.”); Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Towards a Fact-Finding Model of
Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1313 (1990) (“Traditional democratic theory
suggests that the court interpreting a statute must act as the faithful agent of the
legislature’s intent.”).
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should be some exception or regulation made by [C]ongress.”309
Because Congress also regulated the jurisdiction it gave to the
Supreme Court, “an affirmative description of [the Supreme Court’s]
powers must be understood as a regulation, under the [C]onstitu-
tion, prohibiting the exercise of other powers than those de-
scribed.”310 The Court may only review judgments over which “a
power to reexamine ... is expressly given by law.”311 A few years
later, in 1807, Chief Justice Marshall again wrote on the issue:
“courts which are created by written law, and whose jurisdiction is
defined by written law, cannot transcend that jurisdiction.”312
The Taney Court’s strict interpretation of congressional precondi-
tions to suit also flowed from separation of powers concerns. “The
appellate jurisdiction of [the Supreme Court] is, indeed, derived
from the Constitution; but by the express terms of the constitutional
grant, it is subjected to such exceptions and to such regulations as
Congress may make.”313 Because jurisdiction was conferred by
Congress in the first instance, Congress might direct the manner in
which such jurisdiction was exercised; the Taney Court believed
itself powerless to dispense with or modify any requirement.314 The
Court viewed itself to “have no power to receive an appeal in any
other mode than that provided by law.”315 A case that had not been
prosecuted “in the manner directed [by Congress] ... must be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”316
Even in its modern procedural-requirement cases, the Court has
sometimes recognized these principles. In Kontrick v. Ryan, the
Court held that several bankruptcy filing deadlines were claims-
processing rules, rather than jurisdictional ones.317 This conclusion
309. United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 173 (1805). 
310. Id.
311. Id. 
312. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93 (1807).
313. Castro v. United States, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 46, 49 (1865).
314. Id. When “the same authority which gives the jurisdiction has pointed out the manner
in which the case shall be brought before us,” the Court is powerless to dispense with or
modify any requirement. United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106, 113 (1848); see also
Castro, 70 U.S. at 49 (explaining that when Congress provided for the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction, the Court “has always felt itself bound to give effect to the regulations by which
Congress has prescribed the manner of its exercise”).
315. Villabolos v. United States, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 81, 90 (1848).
316. Curry, 47 U.S. at 113.
317. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004).
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was based in part on the fact that “[n]o statute ... specifies a time
limit for filing a complaint objecting to the debtor’s discharge.”318
Because “[o]nly Congress may determine a lower federal court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction,” it was improper to use the term
“jurisdictional” to refer to court-ordained filing rules.319 It is difficult
to see why court-ordained canons like a clear statement rule can
suffice to determine whether a provision is jurisdictional when
court-ordained filing rules are insufficient.
As Professors Eskridge and Frickey explain, from its early days
the Supreme Court has drawn from Article III’s allocation of
authority “the canon that statutes conferring jurisdiction upon
federal courts should be narrowly construed to assure that Congress
and not the courts make decisions about the extent of jurisdic-
tion.”320 The Supreme Court employed this canon in early cases
involving both federal question321 and diversity jurisdiction.322
318. Id. at 448. The federal rules can neither expand nor contract jurisdiction. Id.
319. Id. at 452; see also Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 13 (2005) (per curiam). 
320. Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 233, at 605 (emphasis added); see Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 149-50 (1908) (addressing federal question
jurisdiction); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806) (addressing
diversity jurisdiction).
321. In Mottley, the well-pleaded complaint case, the Court narrowly construed the federal
question statute. Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152. Congress had granted then, as it has now,
jurisdiction to the federal courts in “suit[s] ... arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States.” Id. (quoting Act of August 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 434). The assertion of a
constitutional defense in Mottley made it “very likely” that “a question under the Constitution
would arise,” id., thus satisfying the Constitutional minima of a federal ingredient, United
Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 722-23 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824). However, the Court held that “a suit arises under the
Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff ’s statement of his own
cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution.” Mottley, 211 U.S.
at 152.
322. The early Supreme Court strictly interpreted both the citizenship and amount in
controversy requirements. In Strawbridge, Chief Justice Marshall construed the diversity
requirement narrowly, concluding that the statutory phrase “where ... the suit is between a
citizen of a state where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state” required that every
plaintiff be diverse from every defendant. Strawbridge, 7 U.S. at 267. In a series of cases, the
Court also construed strictly the amount in controversy requirement. The early Court
repeatedly held that the requirement prohibited jurisdiction in cases that involved
fundamental rights because such rights were incapable of being reduced to a monetary value.
See, e.g., Sparrow v. Strong, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 97, 101-02 (1865); Pratt v. Fitzhugh, 66 U.S. (1
Black) 271, 273 (1861); Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 106 (1847); Lee v. Lee, 33 U.S.
(8 Pet.) 44, 48 (1834). Then, in Town of Elgin v. Marshall, the Court made the strict
construction rule explicit. 106 U.S. 578, 582 (1883). Since jurisdiction was governed by
Congress and because of federalism concerns, “it ought not to be extended by doubtful
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Modern courts have also applied the canon of strict construction to
jurisdictional statutes. In Aldinger v. Howard, for example, the
Supreme Court noted that before a court can conclude that jurisdic-
tion exists it “must satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it, but
that Congress in the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not ex-
pressly or by implication negated its existence.”323
The Supreme Court’s clear statement approach to procedural re-
quirements is undertheorized. The efficiency and fairness concerns
that a late dismissal raise are important considerations, but the
Court has not explained why these concerns justify a clear state-
ment approach.324 Nor has it explained how the clear statement rule
fits in with Congress’s undoubted authority over the scope of Article
III. The Court’s reticence is part and parcel of its haphazard
application of the clear statement rule, and it obscures the Court’s
larger project of confining jurisdiction to its proper bounds and
demanding precision in its interpretation. This undertheorization
may help explain both the Court’s inconsistent application, and as
detailed in Part III, the fact that the clear statement rule does not
make much hay.
constructions.” Id. at 580; see also Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934); Matthews v.
Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 525 (1932); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 23-34 (1922).
Thus, because the amount in controversy requirement “draws the boundary line of
jurisdiction, it is to be construed with strictness and rigor.” Marshall, 106 U.S. at 580. In
Snyder v. Harris, the Court strictly construed the diversity statute in the class action context.
“It is linguistically possible, of course,” the Court wrote, “to interpret the old congressional
phrase ‘matter in controversy’ as including all claims that can be joined or brought in a single
suit through the class action device.” 394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969). Yet, the Court declined to do
so on grounds that “[t]he policy of the [diversity] statute calls for ... strict construction.” Id.
at 340 (quoting Healy, 292 U.S. at 270). Federalism values required that federal courts
“scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has
defined.” Id. (quoting Healy, 292 U.S. at 270); see also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978) (“Constitutional power is merely the first hurdle that must be
overcome in determining that a federal court has jurisdiction over a particular controversy.
For the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not only by the provisions of Art. III of the
Constitution, but also by Acts of Congress.”) (citations omitted)).
323. 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (emphasis added), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(2012), as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 555 (2005);
see also Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989); Kroger, 437 U.S. at 365; Palmore, 411
U.S. at 396 (“[W]e are particularly prone to accord ‘strict construction of statutes authorizing
appeals’ to this Court.” (quoting Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41, 42 n.1 (1970))).
324. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013) (explaining that the
clear statement rule prevents “a waste of adjudicatory resources”).
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III. DECIPHERING THE COURT’S JURISDICTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
There are at least three problems with the Court’s clear state-
ment requirement for procedural requirements: (1) the rule is
applied inconsistently, (2) it operates retroactively, and (3) it impli-
cates separation of powers concerns. Each suggests that the clear
statement rule is a poor fit for determining whether a statute is
jurisdictional. Moreover, a close analysis of the Court’s cases reveals
something surprising: the problem-generating clear statement rule
does not appear to be doing much work. The Court has been after
something much bigger; its procedural requirements cases have
quietly narrowed, formalized, and redefined the term jurisdiction.
The clear statement rule is only a means to effect this larger project.
The key insight from the last three decades of cases turns out not
to be the clear statement rule, but rather the Court’s urgent efforts
to redefine the term jurisdiction. Whereas jurisdiction once included
everything from the elements of a cause of action, to the various
procedural steps litigants were required to fulfill, the modern Court
has sought to narrow the term.325 The Court’s effort to “bring some
discipline”326 to the term jurisdiction has resulted in the Court
formalizing and redefining that term—without it saying so. What
does the modern Court mean when it says “jurisdiction”?
“Jurisdiction,” we are told, refers to “a court’s adjudicatory au-
thority.”327 It “speak[s] to the power of the court.”328 Jurisdiction
generally deals with “classes of cases”329 and is not concerned with
“the rights or obligations of the parties.”330 These rules make sense
given the policies underlying subject matter jurisdiction: “protection
of federal rights and interests, comity and federalism, allocation of
325. See supra Part I.
326. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011).
327. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004); see also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick,
559 U.S. 154, 160-61 (2010).
328. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) (quoting Republic Nat’l Bank
of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 100 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)); see also Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (stating that “subject-matter jurisdiction”
refers to “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case”).
329. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455.
330. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274 (quoting Republic Nat’l Bank of Miami, 506 U.S. at 100
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
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judicial resources and docket control, and uniformity.”331 These
values focus primarily on societal considerations, rather than liti-
gant considerations.332
As a result, the Court is suspicious of requirements that resemble
claims-processing rules—rules that “seek to promote the orderly
progress of litigation by requiring that parties take certain proce-
dural steps at certain specified times.”333 These rules address liti-
gant considerations, not the broader concerns implicated by federal
court authority. In contrast to rules affecting party obligations,
jurisdiction refers to “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power
to adjudicate the case.”334
The Court is also careful to distinguish between subject matter
jurisdiction and the substantive elements of a claim. The elements
of a claim generally involve the conduct prohibited or protected and
potential parties to a lawsuit.335 The Court has acknowledged that
Congress may (and occasionally does) make the elements of a cause
of action jurisdictional, but this is the rare exception rather than the
rule.336 The substance of a claim generally does not implicate the
“courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”337
Similarly, limits that affect the “mode of relief ... ancillary to the
judgment of a court that [already] has plenary jurisdiction” are not
usually jurisdictional.338
Although the Supreme Court has at times recited the mantra that
jurisdiction goes to the Court’s power,339 the Court’s recent precision
is something new. From the Marshall Court, to the Taney Court,
and to the more modern Court, the term jurisdiction was used fre-
quently to describe everything from filing deadlines, to the elements
of a particular cause of action, regardless of whether Congress had
directed the provision at the adjudicatory authority of the federal
331. Dodson, supra note 140, at 7; see Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention,
88 MICH. L. REV. 530, 550-54 (1989).
332. Dodson, supra note 140, at 7.
333. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011).
334. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1997).
335. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure, supra note 5, at 1550-51. 
336. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006).
337. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89.
338. Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413 (2004).
339. See, e.g., McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1915) (“The foundation of jurisdiction
is physical power.”); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-14 (1869).
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courts.340 The lower federal courts were in disarray as they too
struggled with the distinction between jurisdiction, substance, and
procedure.341 As late as 1987, a unanimous Court characterized the
merits-seeming inquiry of whether section 505(a) of the Clean Water
Act allows suits for wholly past violations as a question of jurisdic-
tion.342 Furthermore, in 1998, Justice Stevens argued that there is
no difference between a jurisdictional provision and an element of
a cause of action.343
Since its 1988 decision in Steel Co., the Court has required more
precision of courts undertaking a jurisdictional inquiry. Reviewing
courts must ask whether a statutory provision is truly jurisdictional;
in other words, whether it speaks to the power of the federal courts.
This pointed inquiry, not a clear statement thumb on the scales, has
been the key behind the Court’s reining in of an overbroad and im-
precise view of jurisdiction. And it does so without a distortive
application of a clear statement rule. As scholars note, the Court’s
formalized definition of jurisdiction is a welcome step in the right
direction.344 Given the drastic consequences that attach to a jurisdic-
tional provision, precision as to jurisdiction is critically important.
The Court’s focus on whether a provision addresses the power of the
340. See supra Part I.A; see also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (“Bain’s
elastic concept of jurisdiction is not what the term ‘jurisdiction’ means today, i.e., ‘the courts’
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.’” (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89)).
341. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 77 (describing confusion between jurisdiction and the
merits); Dane, supra note 210, at 105-07; Mark A. Hall, The Jurisdictional Nature of the Time
to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV. 399, 399-401 (1986) (discussing time to appeal); Philip A. Pucillo,
Rescuing Rule 3(c) from the 800-Pound Gorilla: The Case for a No-Nonsense Approach to
Defective Notices of Appeal, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 271, 271-72 (2006) (considering notice of appeal);
Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure, supra note 5, at 1549 (addressing jurisdic-
tion and merits); Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and Misuse, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1457, 1461 (2006) (exploring confusion generally).
342. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 52 (1987);
see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 251 (1991) (suggesting that the defini-
tional sections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—defining employer, employee, and
the like—are jurisdictional).
343. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 112-13 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that the statutory
question “can be viewed in one of two ways: whether [it] confers ‘jurisdiction’ over citizen suits
for wholly past violations, or whether the statute creates such a ‘cause of action’”); id. at 117-
18 (“Rather than framing the question in terms of ‘jurisdiction,’ it is also possible to
characterize the statutory issue in this case as whether respondent’s complaint states a ‘cause
of action.’”).
344. See supra Part II.A.
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Court to hear a case is a much needed return to a more precise def-
inition of jurisdiction.
Still, this important definitional revolution is too often obscured
by the Court’s clear statement rhetoric. This Part demonstrates
that, once one asks the right question regarding jurisdiction, the
problem-creating clear statement rule is unnecessary. It then
sketches out factors that will be important in answering the ques-
tion whether a provision is jurisdictional under the Court’s rede-
fined concept of jurisdiction.
A. The Clear Statement Rule Is Unnecessary
The Supreme Court’s current clear statement rule does not mat-
ter in the mine run of cases. As this Section demonstrates, the
Court’s more precise definition of jurisdiction is enough to decide the
Court’s cases.
To begin, Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., the case that gave rise to the
Court’s bright-line clear statement rule, did not depend upon that
rule for its resolution.345 A close look at Arbaugh instead reveals the
Court’s continuation of its larger mission to redefine and narrow the
term jurisdiction. The case began with the reminder that “[j]urisdic-
tion” has become “a word of many, too many, meanings.”346 “This
Court,” the Court continued, “no less than other courts, has some-
times been profligate in its use of the term.”347 This profligate over-
use led to the question presented in Arbaugh: whether the numer-
ical qualification of fifteen employees affected federal court jurisdic-
tion or was simply an element of a Title VII claim for relief.348
The Supreme Court began by describing the lower court’s
conflation of two concepts—jurisdiction and the elements of a
claim—and in its rejection of this elision the Court’s narrowed
definition of jurisdiction becomes apparent.349 The Court observed
that judicial decisions “often obscure the issue by stating that the
court is dismissing ‘for lack of jurisdiction’ when some threshold fact
has not been established, without explicitly considering whether the
345. 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006).
346. Id. at 510 (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 503.
349. Id.
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dismissal should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for
failure to state a claim.”350 The Court explained the error in this
approach. Jurisdiction had a formal meaning: it described only
requirements “involv[ing] a court’s power to hear a case.”351 The real
question was “whether the federal court had authority to adjudicate
the claim in suit.”352 Moreover, prior cases that had failed to apply
this more precise definition of jurisdiction were “drive-by jurisdic-
tional rulings” that should be accorded “no precedential effect.”353
The employee-numerosity requirement found in Title VII did not
meet the Court’s narrowed definition of jurisdiction.354 It appeared
in a section entitled “Definitions,” and the Court found that nothing
in the text of the requirement355 suggested that Congress intended
the provision to have jurisdictional consequences, like sua sponte
consideration.356 The federal courts already had power to hear the
case under the general jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.357 As
a result, the Court concluded that the fifteen-employee threshold
“does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the
jurisdiction of the district courts.”358 It was simply an element of a
claim that a Title VII plaintiff must prove.359
Although the Arbaugh Court went on to create out of whole cloth
the clear statement requirement, its new rule was not necessary to
its disposition. It was only after the Court concluded that the
numerosity requirement failed to satisfy its new definition of juris-
diction that the Court conjured up the clear statement rule. Citing
“fairness” and the potential “waste of judicial resources” that a
350. Id. at 511 (quoting Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000)).
351. Id. at 514 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630
(2002)).
352. Id. at 511 (emphasis added) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S.
83, 91 (1998)).
353. Id. (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 91).
354. Id. at 515.
355. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day.”).
356. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 506-07.
357. Id. at 507.
358. Id. at 515 (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982)). 
359. Id. at 515-16. Although Title VII does have its own jurisdictional provision, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(3), that provision does not suggest that everything contained within Title VII is
jurisdictional. Rather, the provision was intended to expand jurisdiction beyond the general
federal question jurisdiction provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and its $10,000 amount-in-
controversy minimum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (2012).
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jurisdictional requirement would entail, the Court found it “the
sounder course ... to leave the ball in Congress’s court.”360
Even the clear statement rule itself depends upon the Court’s
narrowed definition of the term jurisdiction. From Arbaugh, we get
the test:
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a
statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and
litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle
with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory
limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the
restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.361
But this bright-line rule depends upon the definition of “jurisdic-
tional”—a term that has been understood to mean different things
at different times. It was the Court’s more precise definition of
jurisdiction, not the requirement that Congress speak clearly, that
was the deciding factor in Arbaugh.362
What made the case close was prior precedent. The Supreme
Court had to clear away the underbrush of two previous decisions
in which it had suggested that the definitional section of Title VII
might be jurisdictional.363 But even here the clear statement rule
was unnecessary. In Hishon v. King & Spalding, the Supreme Court
reversed the lower court’s finding that Title VII did not apply to the
selection of law firm partners.364 The Court suggested that the dis-
trict court should have dismissed on jurisdictional grounds instead
of dismissing for failure to state a claim.365 EEOC v. Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Co. went further.366 In that case, the Court held that Title
VII did not apply to a suit by a U.S. employee working abroad for a
U.S. employer.367 Both the district court and court of appeals had
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.368 In its opinion, the
360. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 & n.11, 516.
361. Id. at 515-16 (citation and footnote omitted).
362. Id. at 513-14.
363. Id. at 513-15.
364. 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984).
365. Id. at 73 n.2.
366. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
367. Id.
368. Id. at 246-47.
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Court repeatedly referred to Title VII’s definitional section, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e, as “jurisdictional.”369
Yet the Court was not required to treat either case as precedent-
ial. The Court’s disposition in Hishon made it “unnecessary” to
consider whether the definitional provision was actually jurisdic-
tional.370 Similarly, the jurisdictional characterization was unneces-
sary to the decision in Arabian American Oil Co., and the parties
had not argued the point.371 Under Steel Co., the Arbaugh Court was
not compelled to follow decisions labeling a provision jurisdictional
because nothing “turned upon whether [the provision] was techni-
cally jurisdictional.”372
Kontrick v. Ryan (a case decided before Arbaugh’s formal invoca-
tion of a clear statement rule) is another example in which the
Court’s formalized definition of jurisdiction (and not the clear state-
ment rule) is dispositive.373 As in Arbaugh, the Kontrick Court began
with the reminder that courts “have been less than meticulous” in
defining jurisdiction.374 “Jurisdiction,” the Court again observed, “is
a word of many, too many, meanings,” and courts have incorrectly
used it to refer to time prescriptions.375
In explaining why various bankruptcy filing deadlines are not
jurisdictional, the Kontrick Court further expanded upon the Court’s
new definition of jurisdiction.376 The Court found that under Steel
Co., jurisdiction speaks to the power of the courts.377 The Court
wrote, “Clarity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the
label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claim-processing rules, but only for pre-
scriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdic-
tion) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s
adjudicatory authority.”378 Claims-processing rules are ones that
369. See id. at 251 (“Petitioners’ reliance on Title VII’s jurisdictional provisions.”); id. at
253 (“Thus petitioners’ argument based on the jurisdictional language of Title VII fails.”).
370. 467 U.S. at 73 n.2.
371. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
372. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998).
373. 540 U.S. 443 (2004).
374. Id. at 454.
375. Id. (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90).
376. Id. at 455.
377. Id. 
378. Id. This definition of jurisdiction could be quite narrow, excluding all procedural
requirements as claims processing rules, but the Court has not adhered to the strict
distinction.
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“seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that
the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified
times.”379 They are not directed at the power of the federal courts,
but rather describe the obligations of litigants. This claims-process-
ing distinction has come to animate many of the Supreme Court’s
procedural requirements cases and operates independently of the
clear statement rule.
Additionally, the Court relied on the fact that the bankruptcy
filing deadlines at issue in Kontrick were court-created rules.380
“Only Congress,” the Court wrote, might “determine a lower federal
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”381 This factor also operates
independently of the clear statement rule.
Although the Supreme Court relied more heavily on the clear
statement rule in Gonzalez v. Thaler—noting that the “clear-state-
ment principle makes particular sense” as applied to AEDPA382—it
is not clear that the eight-to-one outcome would be different without
the rule. In Thaler, the Court considered whether the requirement
that a certificate of appealability (COA) indicate the issue on which
an appellant had shown the denial of a constitutional right was
jurisdictional.383
Even in its phrasing of the question presented, the Court invoked
its new, narrowed definition of jurisdiction. “The question before us
is whether th[e failure of the COA to indicate the constitutional
issue] deprived the Court of Appeals of the power to adjudicate
Gonzalez’s appeal.”384 The Court explained its revisionist view of
jurisdiction: “This Court has endeavored in recent years to ‘bring
some discipline’ to the use of the term ‘jurisdictional.’ ”385 Because
courts had overused the term in the past, the Court had “pressed a
stricter distinction between truly jurisdictional rules, which govern
‘a court’s adjudicatory authority,’ and nonjurisdictional ‘claim-
processing rules,’ which do not.”386
379. Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (2011). 
380. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004).
381. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
382. 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 (2012); id. at 648-49 (applying the “clear-statement principle”).
383. Id. at 646. Certificates of Appeal are issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2012). 
384. Id. at 648 (emphasis added).
385. Id. (quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011)).
386. Id. (citing Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 454-55). 
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The indication requirement did not satisfy this narrowed defini-
tion of jurisdiction.387 Regarding the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3),
the Court found that it “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or
refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the [appeals] courts.”388 More-
over, invoking ordinary canons of statutory construction, the Court
found that “clear” jurisdictional language elsewhere in the statute
indicated that “Congress would have spoken in clearer terms if it
intended § 2253(c)(3) to have similar jurisdictional force.”389 It is not
obvious that the absence of a clear statement rule would have
changed this statutory interpretation.
Furthermore, the lack of a clear statement rule would not have
changed the Court’s analysis of the statute’s purpose or of its policy
considerations. In the Court’s opinion, to construe the indication
provision jurisdictionally would thwart Congress’s purpose of elim-
inating AEDPA delays.390 Once the judge had made the determina-
tion that a COA was warranted, the gatekeeping function of AEDPA
was satisfied, and any further screening based on a defective COA
would be unhelpful.391 Moreover, the Court worried that a petitioner
“has no control over how the judge drafts the COA.”392 This fact
would “compound the ‘unfai[r] prejudice’ resulting from the sua
sponte dismissals and remands that jurisdictional treatment would
entail.”393
The Court dispensed with the State’s four arguments in favor of
finding the indication requirement to be jurisdictional without
referencing the clear statement rule. Each could be dealt with under
the new definition of jurisdiction. The State first argued that the
indication requirement was jurisdictional because it cross-refer-
enced a jurisdictional provision.394 The problem was “that the stat-
ute provides no such thing.”395 Congress placed the requirements
“in distinct paragraphs and, rather than mirroring their terms,
387. Id. at 656.
388. Id. at 644 (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006)).
389. Id. at 649.
390. Id. at 650.
391. Id.
392. Id. 
393. Id. (quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011)).
394. Id. at 651.
395. Id.
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excluded the jurisdictional terms in one from the other.”396 The State
next argued that the word “shall” in § 2253(c)(3) indicated jurisdic-
tional status. The Court disagreed, finding that not “all mandatory
prescriptions, however emphatic, are ... jurisdictional.”397 Nothing
in the statute “establishes that an omitted indication should remain
an open issue [as would be true of a jurisdictional statute] through-
out the case.”398 Third, the Court rejected the argument that “the
placement of § 2253(c)(3) in a section containing jurisdictional provi-
sions signals that it too is jurisdictional.”399 “Mere proximity will not
turn a rule that speaks in nonjurisdictional terms into a jurisdic-
tional hurdle,” the Court wrote.400 Finally, the Court rejected the
argument that a COA was like the appellate filing deadline held
jurisdictional in Bowles, finding that the two deadlines were not
analogous.401 Even though the clear statement rule makes Thaler an
easier case, it seems unlikely that the absence of the rule would
have changed the Court’s mind that the indication requirement was
nonjurisdictional.402
This was also the case for Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical
Center.403 Although the unanimous Court recited the clear state-
ment rule, the rule was not critical to its rationale or outcome.404
Auburn held that the 180-day filing deadline for a healthcare
provider to file a challenge to a reimbursement decision with the
Provider Reimbursement Review Board was nonjurisdictional.405
The Court began with its prior efforts to “ ‘bring some discipline to
the use’ of the term ‘jurisdiction.’ ”406 In pursuit of this goal the
Court had adopted the clear statement rule as a “readily adminis-
trable bright line” for determining whether to classify a statutory
396. Id.




401. Id. at 651-52.
402. See id.
403. 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013).
404. See id. at 824.
405. Id. 
406. Id. (quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011));
see id. (“[J]urisdiction has been a ‘word of many, too many, meanings.’” (quoting Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998))).
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limitation as jurisdictional.407 But that rule did not change the
result in Auburn.
Engaging in ordinary statutory interpretation, the Court conclud-
ed that the provision did not meet its definition of jurisdiction—it
“does not speak in jurisdictional terms.”408 Nor was the 180-day
filing deadline “ ‘jurisdictional’ in tone.”409 The Court explained that
language Congress used did not reveal a design to oust the federal
courts of power every time the condition went unmet.410 Moreover,
the Court’s recent cases applying the more narrow view of jurisdic-
tion supported this result. The Court’s recent and repeated decisions
holding filing deadlines nonjurisdictional under the Court’s new
definition of jurisdiction were key to the decision in Auburn.411
Auburn rejected the statutory arguments that the filing deadline
was jurisdictional: (1) because of its placement among other jurisdic-
tional provisions and (2) because Congress elsewhere had indicated
that beneficiary (but not provider) deadlines might be extended.412
These arguments appeared to have some merit, and yet, the Court
rejected them without resort to the clear statement principle.413
With respect to proximity, the Court wrote, “A requirement we
would otherwise classify as nonjurisdictional, does not become juris-
dictional simply because it is placed in a section of a statute that
also contains jurisdictional provisions.”414
The Court also dispatched with ease the argument that the 180-
day time limit should be viewed as jurisdictional because Congress
could have expressly made the provision nonjurisdictional—as it
had done for other time limits in the Medicare Act.415 The Court
recognized that ordinarily “Congress’s use of ‘certain language in
one part of the statute and different language in another’ can
indicate that ‘different meanings were intended.’ ”416 But once again
the Court used ordinary tools of construction to dispatch the claim:
407. Id. (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006)). 
408. Id. (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982)).
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. See id. at 825.
412. Id. at 825-26.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 825.
415. Id.
416. Id. (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004)).
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“the interpretive guide just identified, is ‘no more than [a] rul[e] of
thumb’ that can tip the scales when a statute could be read in multi-
ple ways.”417 The Court was “persuaded that the time limitation ...
is most sensibly characterized as a nonjurisdictional prescription.”418
This sensible characterization depended upon the Court’s narrowed
definition of jurisdiction, not the clear statement rule.419
The last three decades of procedural requirements cases show a
Court engaged in an important project: the modern Court has
formalized and made more precise the term jurisdiction. The term
now refers only to authority-conferring provisions. This important
project has been obscured by the Court’s invocation of a clear
statement rule,420 but that rule is secondary at best—its application
depends entirely upon the Court’s definition of jurisdiction—and
often makes no difference to the outcome of a case. In light of the
application problems the clear statement approach engenders, the
Court should abandon the clear statement rule and focus on the key
definitional inquiry it has laid out. The next Section sketches out
how the Court should go about analyzing whether a provision meets
the Court’s more precise definition of jurisdiction—without the clear
statement rule.
B. Jurisdiction Sans the Clear Statement Rule
What will jurisdictional questions look like without the clear
statement rule? Once one focuses on the inquiry driving the Court’s
cases—whether a statute limits the power of the federal courts to
adjudicate a case—it becomes relatively easy to identify factors
important to this inquiry. One can get to the “right” answer and
without the distortive effects of a clear statement rule.
At the outset, Arbaugh’s clear statement rule is unhelpful in
deciding whether a provision is jurisdictional—unless one knows
what the Court means when it says “jurisdiction.” From Arbaugh,
we learn that “[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a threshold
limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then
courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to
417. Id. at 825-26 (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992)).
418. Id. at 826.
419. Id. at 825-26.
420. See supra Part II.B-D.
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wrestle with the issue.”421 But we have no idea what “jurisdictional”
means. The clear statement rule turns on a term that has been
understood to mean different things at different times.
Although it is easy to miss amongst the clear statement rhetoric,
the Court’s cases quietly redefine jurisdiction to mean something
quite specific: a limitation on the power of the federal courts to ad-
judicate cases.422 Jurisdiction “speak[s] to the power of the court;”423
jurisdiction is not ordinarily concerned with the “rights or obliga-
tions of the parties,”424 or with provisions that define a substantive
cause of action.425 These principles begin to develop a framework for
analyzing cases under the Supreme Court’s more precise definition
of jurisdiction.
First, the text. Textual interpretation turns on whether Congress
has conditioned the power of the federal courts to hear a case upon
compliance with a procedural requirement.426 Procedural require-
ments may be phrased in language that plainly limits the power of
the federal courts.427 For example, the Tax Injunction Act provides:
“The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assess-
ment, levy or collection of any tax under State law.”428 But under
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, Congress need not say
jurisdiction in so many words. The question is whether the words
Congress used embody a limitation on the authority of the federal
courts to hear cases or whether they are instead merely elements of
a cause of action or conditions that litigants must fulfill. This latter
inquiry focuses on whom Congress is constraining—the federal
courts or litigants.
Second, the specific context of the procedural requirement. Sever-
al context factors are relevant to whether Congress meant to limit
the power of the federal courts to hear cases. A key indicator is
421. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006).
422. See, e.g., Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452-53 (2004).
423. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) (quoting Republic Nat’l Bank
of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 100 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)); see also Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction” refers to
“the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”).
424. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274.
425. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515-16.
426. See, e.g., Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 452-53.
427. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
428. Id. (emphasis added).
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whether the precondition is part and parcel of a legislative enact-
ment that governs the jurisdiction of the federal courts in some way.
For example, the condition may be part of a grant of jurisdiction
over a particular category of cases in certain circumstances.429 Such
a statutory enactment suggests that Congress was concerned about
the power of courts to hear certain cases when it promulgated the
requirement; the placement of a precondition in a jurisdictional
provision “is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative in-
tent.”430 Thus a procedural requirement promulgated as part of a
jurisdictional grant may indicate that Congress meant to condition
jurisdiction upon compliance with the procedural requirement. On
the other hand, if Congress has already provided for jurisdiction,431
it is far less likely that Congress meant to cut off access to federal
courts when it imposed a particular precondition to suit.432
Likewise, a key consideration is whether Congress has provided
exceptions to the procedural requirement—suggesting that the
federal courts may still have power to hear a case notwithstanding
noncompliance with a procedural condition.433 Such exceptions
indicate that Congress intended to require something of litigants,
not limit the power of the federal courts.434 Finally, the Court’s
interpretation of related statutes may provide relevant benchmarks
as to whether Congress intended to limit the adjudicative authority
of federal courts.435
429. See, e.g., id. § 1331.
430. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 827 (2013) (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t
of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)).
431. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332.
432. It is not the placement in the United States Code that is important per se, but rather
the enactment of a requirement as part of a jurisdictional provision. Focusing on placement
alone has allowed the Supreme Court to routinely reject proximity-based arguments. Auburn,
133 S. Ct. at 825; Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1205 (2011).
When Congress enacts a requirement as part of a jurisdictional grant, however, it is not mere
proximity that is important but that Congress had jurisdiction in view when it enacted the
procedural requirement.
433. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 159, 163-64 (2010).
434. Id. at 164.
435. Id.
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Third, the broader context of the statute as a whole. The overall
statutory scheme may provide “telling” evidence of whether
Congress intended for a procedural requirement to constrain the
adjudicatory purview of the federal courts.436 One example in which
broad context matters is procedural time limits.437 With respect to
jurisdictionality, statutes of limitations generally fall into two cate-
gories: statutes of limitations in suits against nongovernmental
actors and statutes of limitations in suits against the government.438
Courts have long considered limitations statutes in suits against
nongovernmental actors as nonjurisdictional.439 Suits against the
government, however, have a more nuanced history. Courts custom-
arily considered these statutes to be “jurisdictional” on the theory
that judges must strictly construe requirements attached to a
waiver of sovereign immunity.440 More recently, the Court has
inconsistently dealt with the effect of time limits in suits against the
government.441 Regarding statutes of limitations, then, two general
rules can be drawn. Statutes of limitations against private defen-
dants are likely nonjurisdictional. Statutes of limitations that pro-
tect a government defendant, however, can go either way and re-
quire further analysis.
Finally, past interpretations of a provision are relevant for
determining whether a requirement circumscribes the power of the
federal courts. But reliance on past precedent in the jurisdictional
context is complex. The Court has time and again pointed out that
it has been “less than meticulous” with its use of the phrase
436. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1205.
437. See, e.g., Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 94-95 (1990).
438. Compare Irwin, 498 U.S. at 94, with Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385,
395 (1982).
439. For suits against private defendants, there is a rebuttable presumption that equitable
tolling rules apply, and courts will likely find any limitation as nonjurisdictional. See Irwin,
498 U.S. at 95-96.
440. Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957); see also Finn v. United States, 123
U.S. 227, 232-33 (1887); Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123, 125-26 (1883).
441. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 94. The rule that limitations statutes must be strictly construed in
suits against the government was not applied in two twentieth-century cases, and in Irwin
the Court announced a “principle of interpretation” and held that the rebuttable presumption
that equitable tolling rules “applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply
to suits against the United States.” Id. at 95-96. However, the Court did not apply this
“general rule” in the more recent case of John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S.
130, 137 (2008).
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“jurisdiction”—thus an exception to stare decisis principles may
apply.442 Reviewing courts need not attach jurisdictional conse-
quences to a precondition to suit based merely upon past use of the
phrase. Rather, courts should analyze the legal substance of each
prior case to determine whether the Supreme Court has treated the
provision jurisdictionally or simply labeled it so.
The new approach to procedural requirements does much to
reconcile the Supreme Court’s approach (though perhaps not as
easily its decisions) in Bowles and John R. In both cases, the Court
seemingly discarded its clear statement approach in favor of stare
decisis principles.443 Further, although the Court has been at pains
to reconcile Bowles and John R. with its clear statement approach
by invoking congressional acquiescence, those efforts have fallen
short. An approach that asks the right question—whether Congress
limited the power of the federal courts—would permit recourse to
past precedent, thus reconciling in large measure the approach
taken in Bowles and John R. Nevertheless, because an exception to
stare decisis exists when the prior decision has not been well-
considered, courts must use stare decisis principles carefully when
considering the jurisdictionality of a statute. Both Bowles and John
R. represent difficult cases, even accounting for stare decisis.444
442. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006).
443. The Bowles Court relied on the fact that the Court “has long held that the taking of
an appeal within the prescribed time is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’” Bowles v. Russell, 551
U.S. 205, 209 (2007). In John R., the departure from a clear statement approach was even
more apparent. The Court relied exclusively on “basic principles of stare decisis.” John R.
Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 137.
444. The text in Bowles is ambiguous as to whether Congress intended to condition the
power of the federal courts to hear cases. The mandatory language—that “no appeal shall” be
taken unless a notice of appeal is filed within 30 days unless “[t]he district court may [in
certain circumstances] reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days”—is plausibly read
as placing a requirement on litigants, not courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2012). The provision is
not part of a jurisdictional provision, which leans against jurisdictional treatment. The
specific context—a notice of appeal—suggests jurisdictional treatment because the Court has
always treated appellate filing deadlines as jurisdictional. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214. The
precedent, however, is complicated. The Court has held that filing deadlines for notices of
appeal are jurisdictional. See, e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 247 (1998) (“manda-
tory and jurisdictional”); Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 60 (1982)
(same); Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (same); United States
v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960) (same); see also Scarborough v. Pargoud, 108 U.S. 567,
568 (1883) (“[T]he writ of error in this case was not brought within the time limited by law,
and we have consequently no jurisdiction.”); United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 106, 113
(1848) (“[A]s this appeal has not been prosecuted in the manner directed, within the time
2094 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:2027
Asking the right question—whether Congress has limited the
power of the federal courts—will also allow judges, who are other-
wise so inclined, to resort to additional interpretive aids like the
purpose of a statute and to consult legislative history. This inquiry
is more straightforward than the Court’s current approach. Review-
ing courts will not need to worry about the evidentiary limitations
of the clear statement approach and will simply inquire whether
Congress deprived the federal courts of the power to hear a case
when a certain condition went unmet.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether a federal court has jurisdiction makes or
breaks the lawsuit. How the Supreme Court goes about determining
the answer to this question is critically important. The modern
Court has revolutionized the way federal courts look at the question
of jurisdiction. It has required Congress to speak clearly in order for
a court to find a procedural requirement jurisdictional. This
reverses centuries of precedent that viewed procedural require-
ments as presumptively jurisdictional. It also makes a muddle of the
case law as the Court deals with unintended consequences of its
clear statement rule. The outcome is inconsistent results and arbi-
trary justice. But when one decodes the Supreme Court’s cases,
another doctrinal shift becomes apparent. The Court has sought to
formalize and redefine the definition of jurisdiction. It has directed
limited by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”). But this
precedent is not as ironclad as the Court suggested. See Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v.
Russell, supra note 5, at 635-39 (explaining that in some cases the jurisdictional conclusion
was not necessary to the outcome and identifying other cases that are in tension with a
jurisdictional rule). Further, the Court more recently suggested that time prescriptions in
general “are not properly typed ‘jurisdictional.’” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510.
In John R., the statutory text is once again ambiguous: “Every claim of which the United
States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon
is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.” 28 U.S.C. § 2501. The mandatory
language, “shall be barred,” is strict, but plausible if interpreted as a mandatory condition
imposed on litigants rather than a power-limiting provision imposed on courts. Id. In addition,
the precedent is complicated. The Court has historically considered statutes of limitation for
suits against the government jurisdictional. See Soriano, 352 U.S. at 276 (limitations in suits
against the government “must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be
implied”); Finn, 123 U.S. at 232-33; Kendall, 107 U.S. at 125-26. More recently, the Supreme
Court has adopted a rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling applies to suits against the
government. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95-96.
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lower courts to use the term jurisdiction only when the provision di-
rectly points to the power of the federal courts. This quiet changing
of definitions, not the clear statement rule, has revolutionized the
way federal courts look at jurisdiction. And it is this new definition,
sans the clear statement rule, that deserves close analysis.
